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Markets and Democracy:
The Illegitimacy of Corporate Law
DANIEL J.H. GREENWOOD*
Corporate law does not conform to ordinary democratic norms: unlike human citizens, 
corporations may decide which law will govern their most fundamental acts of self-governance. 
The corporate law corporation choose in turn influences the corporate goals and decision-making 
processes that determine what the corporation looks for in corporate law in a reflexive system 
independent of ordinary political processes.  This system seems on its face to violate the most 
fundamental principle of popular sovereignty–all non-Delaware citizens of the United States are 
excluded from even formal participation in the process of determining American corporate law, 
and even Delaware citizens are reduced to a largely formalistic ratification role of results 
coerced, to a large extent, by the market for corporate control and the internal norms of a self-
replicating system of law that has escaped from political control.
Corporate law scholars have devoted many pages to debating whether the surrender of 
corporate law to a market for corporate reincorporation generates substantively good or bad 
results, but there has been virtually no discussion of whether this process can be squared with the 
American commitment to self-governance.  This Article aims to address that latter issue–with its 
obvious implications for other areas in which we, consciously or unconsciously, decide to 
subordinate politics to markets or vice versa.
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Introduction
Corporate law defies basic democratic principles.  While democratic theory 
insists that the governed should choose their governors, and even more importantly, their 
system of government, the American system of corporate law removes most important 
questions of corporate law from the political process.  Citizens, acting through the 
political process as presently constituted, have effectively no say in constituting corporate 
law.  The law and the corporations formed under it are instead products of a market that 
by historical accident has freed itself from political control.
Our corporate law is chosen by the very corporate managers who ought to be 
controlled by it, and created by lawyers, legislatures and judges unanswerable to the 
people whose lives are affected by it.  Large corporations and Delaware determine the 
nation’s corporate law, and the rest of us are not even “virtually represented.”  Under the 
Delaware system, corporate managers are entrusted with stewardship of enormous 
concentrations of wealth and power–in many instances both larger and more important in 
our daily lives than most governmental units–with little supervision or answerability to 
the political process.  These autonomous power concentrations, in turn, are granted the 
strikingly unusual right to choose the law that governs them, thus guaranteeing that 
corporate law will continue to respect their independence from the will of the people.  In 
short, we have created institutions of major importance and power and then set them on 
their way to do good or ill with little control or influence by the citizens whom, 
ultimately, they should serve.
Moreover, the primary legal guidance we do give the directors and managers of 
these autonomous entities is to direct them to act as honest agents and professionals.  
That is, ordinary principles of fiduciary duty and agency law require them to set aside 
their own values, interests and political views in favor of those of their client, the 
corporation itself (or sometimes its shareholders, taken as a legal fiction consisting solely 
of a desire to maximize the value of a particular company’s common stock without regard 
for any competing economic or non-economic value).  
Conventionally, this professionalism is viewed as the answer to the democratic 
republican critique of corporate law.  So long as managers and directors are constrained 
to this professional role, the argument goes, we need not fear the enormous aggregations 
of power in their hands.  As a result, much of corporate law centers on the so-called 
agency cost problem: how to keep managers working for the firm rather than merely 
themselves. 
But even were managers to act in complete good faith according to the role 
norms of fiduciary responsibility, the republican problem would not be solved.  Even role 
bound managers are not statesmen balancing the multifarious and conflicting interests of 
a diverse population in pursuit of an elusive public good.  Indeed, they are not even 
agents representing human citizens.  Rather, their client is a legal fiction, an abstraction 
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deemed by the law (and the sociological structures in which managers are enmeshed) to 
have only one interest and one goal.  Rather than balancing, managers acting in good 
faith simply ignore all but one of the goals and interests of the human citizens involved in 
the corporation. 
Moreover, were the republican problem solved, the democratic one would 
remain.  No one elected these non-philosophers king.  The value conflicts they mediate–
by ignoring them–are central political issues in any democratic society.  Wealth 
maximization inevitably conflicts with other environmental, aesthetic, cultural or 
economic goal, or freedom, liberty, equality or justice.  What to do when those values 
conflict ought to be the subject of political debate, not “expert” dictat, let alone concealed 
and decided always in favor of maximizing returns to shares.
In short, the current Delaware corporate law system creates institutions governed 
by managers and directors who are commanded to set aside all values but profit–and then 
to pursue law that maintains this peculiar institution without popular review.     
The paper proceeds as follows: 
Part I motivates the study, especially for readers inclined to accept the 
conventional wisdom that corporate law is empty and apolitical.  Contrary to the 
mythology, I first contend, corporate law is centrally important in a republican 
democracy.  Public corporations are vehicles by which we make difficult value choices in 
a value laden world.  But under our current law, they make those choices independent of 
the values of the citizens who are affected by their decisions.  Second, the common 
rhetorical strategies used to present corporations as powerless and passive–the metaphors 
of contract, property, agency, fictionality and individuality–cannot do the work 
demanded of them.  Through the “mists of metaphor” a harsher reality peeks.1
Corporations are power centers, loci of value struggles, political fora.  They are not 
citizens but governance structures and not neutral but deeply influential–if illegitimate–
participants in our political struggles.
The market-like evolutionary method of law creation of the race to the 
top/bottom is quite different from democracy, even in its debased interest-group 
competition form.  One result is that Delaware corporate law commands the consent of 
the governed corporations (but not of the people who compose them) in a strong sense 
unattainable in ordinary democratic regimes governing human beings.  This system, then, 
is not a democracy but a corporation-ocracy: we have given our corporations a strong 
citizenship denied to mere humans. 
The free bargaining aspects of our current system of corporate law creation 
necessarily mean that the most powerful get the law they want.  Indeed, the great race to 
the top/race to the bottom controversy can best be understood as a debate over whether 
managers or shareholders are more empowered by the economic and legal landscape and 
1Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926) (describing veil piercing doctrine as “enveloped in the mists of 
metaphor”). 
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thus more able to form corporate law in their own interest.  In my view, the relative 
power of shareholders and managers is highly contingent (and greatly influenced by 
current corporate law).  As a result, our current system does not head towards a single 
inevitable equilibrium, but rather has the potential for radical shifts.  Thus, the dramatic 
shift in the allocation of corporate proceeds that characterized the 1980s (empowering 
shareholders) and then, differently, the late 1990s (empowering managers above all) were 
neither anomalies nor proof of the progressive nature of corporate law:   the structured 
competition of corporate law creation cannot yield a determinate outcome.
Part II takes the next step.  Were corporations citizens, the American corporate 
law system arguably would avoid some of the most troubling theoretical problems of 
democratic process, particularly the majoritarian difficulty and the social choice 
paradoxes. Similarly, it would avoid many of the potential practical problems of 
democratic action in a world of limited attention and limited citizen interest.  Corporate 
law derives much of its ideological power and persuasiveness, it seems to me, from this 
picture: the entity, aggregate and property views of the corporation each suggest that 
corporations can be seen, metaphorically, as citizens.  If they were citizens, our corporate 
law would not merely be democratically acceptable but extraordinarily successful.  
Corporate law would be our closest approximation to the liberal democratic ideal of a 
non-coercive state. 
But the claim that corporations are citizens is false.  Once  corporations are 
understood as power sources, a part of our governance system rather than an object of it, 
then the market for law appears radically illegitimate, an example of the powerful seizing 
the power of the state to increase their own power. Rather than seeing corporations as 
Tocquevillian intermediate institutions restraining the state, we should see them as state-
like themselves, part of the classic liberal nightmare of a state acting in its own interest 
not that of its citizens.
The contract view of the corporation and the micro-economic theory of the black 
box assert that the firm is simply a private transaction or set of transactions in the market, 
to which only restitutive, non-distributive, justice issues apply.  For much the same 
reasons that have led us to reject laissez-faire generally, the claim that the market for 
corporate law is fair or non-coercive must fail.
 Part III completes the picture by arguing that corporate law affects all of us, not 
just the corporations who are its alleged subjects. In the perfectly competitive equilibrium 
market of economic theory, all proceeds of corporate activity are imagined to  go to 
consumers, with shareholders, employees and managers understood to be mere factors of 
production paid their marginal cost.  But life is lived at disequilibrium.  In  disequilibrium 
markets, successful corporations should generate a surplus above those costs (even 
assuming that the relevant markets are competitive enough to make the concept of “cost” 
determinate).  In ordinary language, corporations seek to produce a profit and sometimes 
do.  The resulting producer’s surplus is a pure rent, available for appropriation by any 
corporate participant without efficiency implications.  
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Corporate law, however, favors one side in the struggle over the surplus created 
by corporate (collective) activity.  It holds that employees, suppliers, customers, 
bondholders and neighbors are all outsiders, with whom the corporation bargains at arms 
length.  Following the “morals of the marketplace,” it should therefore treat them as 
inputs to be exploited to whatever extent possible.  For the corporation to voluntarily act 
in the interest of these factors of production solely because it cares about them would be 
an egregious breach of legally imposed duty.  Corporate law, in turn, determines that 
certain other corporate participants–in the ordinary course, just shareholders–are the 
objects of a fiduciary duty; when the corporation acts in their interests it is acting in its 
own interests by legal definition.  
The distinction between insiders and outsiders is central, deeply political and 
legal rather than economic.  It is not an artifact of the market but rather defines the 
structure within which the market will function. In the imperfect markets of reality, that 
issue is centrally important.  A corporation that is directed to maximize shareholder 
returns will systematically act differently than one that is directed to minimize customer 
costs, to maximize quality or job satisfaction, or to consider all these goals and to balance 
them in some political, legal or professional process.  The argument that corporations are 
perfectly private fails, then, because it is the law—a law with no democratic 
credentials—that determines for whom and for what ends corporations act.
The decision about who is a member of a firm is thus an intensely political one, 
likely to affect almost every aspect of our collective life.  The market generates an 
answer, or competing answers, under particular conditions.  But those answers reflect 
market power–not justice, efficiency or even political victory.  Moreover, the market-
based system hinders the political debate that could properly balance the values of 
economic growth against its costs: increased relative inequality, mobility and change, and 
most importantly, the devaluing of human effort that comes from being understood as a 
means rather than an end.
I.  The Illegitimate Origins Of Corporate Law
A.  What Is At Stake
Corporate law matters. Corporate law structures the ways in which corporations 
make decisions, respond to the pressures or constraints of markets, constituents and other 
laws, allocate their surplus and balance conflicting moral or political demands.  
Current corporate law directs corporate managers–the proximate decision-
makers–to set aside all values other than share value maximization.  More importantly, it 
directs those managers to view all participants in the corporation, with the sole exception 
of shareholders, as outsiders to be bargained with at arms-length or  tools to be exploited 
(within the limits of the law) rather than, for example, fellow adventurers or partners in a 
common enterprise.  In a kind of anti-Kantianism, people are always means, never ends 
in themselves, always exploited as if we had no value of our own.  Managers following 
these rules will view their fellow citizens, both inside and outside the firm, much as old-
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fashioned imperialists viewed the colonized natives of a foreign territory.  We, self-
colonized, are merely tools to a greater end: an ever-rising stock market.
Corporate law structures the incentives of managers in a way largely consistent 
with this narrow understanding of their role, with one large exception: managers have 
both incentives and ability to betray their obligations to shareholders in the cause of pure 
self-interest.  Our corporate law, then, creates an apparent dichotomy.  On the one hand, 
managers stand as fiduciaries and professionals, who work selflessly for their masters, the 
shares (as good colonial officials exploited the natives incorruptibly for the benefit of 
their masters in the imperial center).  On the other hand stand managers as self-interested 
kleptocrats, appropriating what is not theirs for their own self aggrandizement.2
Under current corporate law models, corporate law debates are largely about the 
extent to which corporate managers are constrained to place share value maximization 
above manager wealth maximization.  Almost no one argues that the latter is a legitimate 
goal; the debate is rather whether it is a useful means to the primary, share centered, goal, 
or an unfortunate side effect of market and regulatory failure.   
But the dichotomy of current corporate law is deceptive.  Public corporations are 
more than their shares and their managers: they are also our jobs (and thus, for most of 
us, a primary focus of our creative and social lives), the architects of our cities, the 
sources of our salaries, medical benefits and pensions, our neighbors, the manufacturers 
of our consumer goods and the suppliers of our services. These values are not fully 
captured by the interests of either the shares or managers.  
Corporations could be run with an eye to many values that drop out of our 
current system or appear only as external constraints.  Thus, one could imagine a 
corporate law that directed corporate managers to maximize job creation or wages, or 
work-place creativity or autonomy, or product quality, or civic responsibility, or 
environmental quality, or family quality time or enhancement of republican self-
definition, or encouraged consideration of the myriad ways in which those disparate goals 
conflict or support one another.  In such a firm, share value might be a constraint rather 
than a goal, much as employee wages are a constraint on the share value maximizing 
firm: Shares would be allocated only so much of the firm’s assets as is necessary to 
attract the minimum necessary amount of capital.  
2Edmund Burke’s denunciations of the East India Company, then, stand as early epitomes of the corporate form and its 
discontents.  Edmund Burke (attributed), Ninth Report of Select Committee, 25 June 1783, reprinted in 5 WRITINGS AND 
SPEECHES OF EDMUND BURKE (P.J. Marshall, ed. 1981) 235-6, 242, 250,295 and generally (denouncing profits of 
Company employees made at expense of India and the company alike).  Burke denounces the Company’s system as 
leading to the destruction of India’s economy without any gain to the Company (although its employees made great and 
famous fortunes), beginning from the fundamental premise that a project based on immorality is unlikely to generate great 
ethics in its participants: “For so longa s a System prevails, which regards the Transmission of great Wealth to this 
Country, either for the Company or the State, as its principal End, so long will it be impossible that those who are the 
Instruments of that Scheme, should not be actuated by the same Spirit for their own private Purposes. ... It is not reasonably 
to be expected, that a Public, rapacious and improvident, should be served by any of its Subordinates with 
Disinterestedness or Foresight.” (Id. at 222).   
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A world in which corporate managers were directed to consider corporate 
participants as partners and their diverse goals as goals of the firm would look quite 
different from our own.   Under current corporate law, it is always proper for 
corporations to cut “costs” at the expense of society as a whole, for example by failing to 
use the best available environmental protection technology, or at the expense of corporate 
participants specifically, for example by refusing to honor (legally non-binding) promises 
of long-term employment on good behavior or generous pension or medical benefits.  
Corporate law debate, instead, concerns the difficult issue of whether managers are 
obliged to cause their corporations to free ride in this manner whenever it is share value 
maximizing to do so, and whether (as a matter of corporate law) they may free ride even 
when according to non-corporate law norms they should not.  At the limit, current 
corporate law norms suggest that corporations assess all law according to the share value 
maximization principle: They should violate even the criminal law if it is share-value 
maximizing to do so.3
Were corporate law different, corporate managers would make different 
decisions.  If they were told they should consider other values, they would do so more 
often.  If they were told to treat employees (or customers, pensioners, local governments, 
creditors or the biosphere) as partners rather than opponents, they would do so more 
often.  To be sure, in order to manage a firm effectively, managers often must at least 
pretend to treat employees as members of the team.  Generally, there is no other way to 
induce employees to work hard and effectively.  However, current law reminds managers 
that such pretenses are only instrumental.  Ultimately, managers are required to exploit 
employees (including themselves), not work for them.4
Similarly, asbestos and cigarette companies, nuclear power plant builders, forex 
and energy traders,  accounting firms and the like are directed by current corporate law to 
ignore the possibility of truly massive liability: If the worst happens, the corporation’s 
shares will not bear the bulk of the costs.5  Even if something less than the worst happens, 
torts liability “counts” only to the extent that the courts translate collective disapproval 
into monetized damage awards–and that is not how courts work.6  If corporations were 
3Compare Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Antitrust Suits by Targets of Tender Offers, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1155, 
1168 n. 36, 1177 n.57,  (1982) ( "(M)anagers not only may but also should violate the rules when it is profitable to do so.");
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL,THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW, 37-38 (similar) with  Miller v. American 
Telephone & Telegraph, 507 F.2d 759 (1974) (holding that illegal acts, even though committed to benefit the corporation 
understood as its future share value, may amount to a breach of fiduciary duty).  For further discussion of this issue, see 
Kent Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives, 87 VA. L. REV. 1279, 1291-5 (2001) (criticizing  contractarian view of corporation on 
ground that it requires managers to violate the law when it is profitable to do so).  
4See, Daniel JH Greenwood, Enronitis: Why Good Firms Go Bad, 2004 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 773,  
http://www.law.utah.edu/greenwood/html/Enronitis.htm. 
5Interestingly, in Europe, where EC directives are less subject to a race to the top/bottom, corporate law includes 
mandatory protections for employees, creditors and even shareholders absent from U.S. state law or appearing only in the 
Federal securities regime (which is also less subject to the race).  See, e.g., William Carney, The Political Economy of 
Competition for Corporate Charters, 26 J. LEG. STUD. 303, 320-5 (1997).  
6In torts as elsewhere in the law, courts generally treat verdicts as punitive–as expressing extreme outrage in an attempt to 
judge,  reinforce or change the moral calculus made by a human actor.  But corporations are not human actors, and to the 
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not invited to externalize costs through liberal limited liability rules, managers would do 
so less often.  
Corporate law, then, affects how corporate managers make a series of difficult 
value choices, directing them to consider some values–principally share value 
maximization–and ignore others, or treat them only as means to the accredited end.  
Different ends would lead to different corporations.  Accordingly, corporate law matters.  
And like other controversial issues that matter, it ought to be the subject of significant 
political debate. In fact, however, we see little political debate about corporate law.  
To some degree, the silence surrounding corporate law results from an illusion of 
triviality.  Corporate law often appears to be less important than it is as a result of over-
simplified modeling.  Corporate law discussion often take place against a background 
assumption of efficient, equilibrium markets.  Clearly, were our markets perfect, little 
would be at stake in the wider debate I propose.  
In a friction-free market at full equilibrium, all corporate participants, including 
shares and managers, would be paid only their marginal product, which would be equal to 
their marginal cost.  In such a market, corporations would make no economic profit and 
would be fully constrained in all their actions: were they, for example, to pay shares more 
than other companies, they would have higher capital costs, resulting in higher 
production costs, causing failure in the product market.  For familiar Coasian reasons, the 
law would be largely irrelevant, since parties that were allocated legal burdens would 
bargain to shift them to the most efficient cost bearers.
But in the real world, markets are never fully at equilibrium.  Successful 
corporations do have surpluses to distribute, and our current corporate law culture (if not 
the law itself) directs that those surpluses be given to shares, even while inviting top 
managers to take some for themselves.7  The predictable result is that top managers have 
become quite wealthy and shares have rapidly increased in value, while little of the 
economic growth of the last several decades has reached less powerful corporate 
participants.  Moreover, contrary to the simplistic model of a fully effective market, many 
corporate participants have no ability to bargain to reallocate the law’s burdens–most 
obviously, retirees and tort victims are just stuck with whatever corporate law allows 
them to claim against. 
Similarly, corporate law is sometimes discussed as if all managers ignore their 
fiduciary duties.  Current law gives managers plenty of room to cheat (that is, to place 
their own private interests above the ones that, as professionals, they are directed to 
consider).  Given this weak law, if managers respected their duties only when forced to 
do so, the details of fiduciary duties as expounded by the law would not be very 
important.  
extent that they follow the profit motive, they are shameless.  All that counts is the bottom line.  Regulators used to human 
interactions will predictably and consistently under-regulate actors following an a-moral, maximizing mode of behavior. 
7See, e.g., Enronitis, supra n.  (discussing ideological mechanisms leading managers and boards to ever higher CEO pay).
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But the model of managers as constant cheats is deeply implausible.  If all 
managers were perfect cheats, the economy would collapse.  Under current law, investors 
buy shares with only weak protections against self-interested managers.  They must be 
assuming that the moral imperative–the law’s (often unenforceable) demand that 
managers set aside their own interests to work for that of the shares–will be enough to 
cause managers to work for the shares.  The necessary implication is that moral 
imperatives matter.  If we told managers to do something else, they would–not in all 
instances, but in enough to matter.  
The issues raised by corporate law are quintessentially political issues.  We as a 
society value wealth maximization, but we also value how that wealth is distributed,
quality of work, number of jobs, family time, environmental quality, safe products and 
perhaps even urban architecture.  These values necessarily conflict in a disequilibrium 
market: the more of the corporate surplus that is given to shares, the less that is available 
for other corporate claimants.  If corporations are told that it is “cost cutting” to find ways 
to renege on pension promises, but not “profit maximizing” to reduce dividends, it is 
predictable that they will do more of the former and  less of the latter.  (This is why the 
accounting treatment of stock option grants to top managers matters: If decision-makers 
are directed to view options as a “cost,” they will give out fewer of them than if they are 
told they may see them as a pure free will offering costing their fiduciaries nothing).  
Because our values and interests conflict, and we will disagree on how to mediate those 
disagreements, choices must be made.  And the choices are the classic choices of 
democratic politics.  
Political decisions, however, should be debated in political fora.  Possibly such a 
debate would ratify the status quo.  We might conclude that directing managers to 
consider one goal and one goal alone of all the possible worthy aims in the world so 
simplifies their task and the tasks of those who must supervise them that it is worthwhile 
to pay the cost of ignoring other important needs and desires.  But the political debate 
might go a different direction.  We might conclude, for example, that we’d rather have 
our most important economic actors putting environmental considerations front and 
center, rather than treating them as constraints on profit maximization.  We might 
conclude that at some point increased financial wealth is less important than quality of 
life issues, and we’d like the central decision-makers concerned with those issues on a 
day to day basis to consider quality of life directly rather than only as it impacts profits.  
Most importantly, we might conclude that at some point total wealth is less important 
than preserving the rough equality that is necessary for republican government: that the 
American social contract means that we should be willing to have major employers 
sacrifice some growth in return for job stability or job increases or more egalitarian 
wages.
© Daniel J.H. Greenwood
Preliminary Draft - Not For Publication 3/05
9
None of these value conflicts are easy issues and in this Article I do not pretend 
to offer any account of how the political debate about them would or should proceed.8
The point of this Article is more basic: We have created a process for creating corporate 
law that cuts off the debate about the goals and purposes of corporate law.  The race to 
the bottom/top, driven by the anomalous right of corporations (meaning corporate 
managers) to choose their own law, eliminates the forum in which we, as citizens rather 
than as shareholders, ought to be arguing about when share values ought to be sacrificed 
for other republican, democratic, or simply civic values.  We need a political debate and a 
democratic process for making a decision as self-governing citizens, not victims and 
perpetrators of self-colonization.
B.  The Metaphors of Corporate Law
Commentators have attempted to legitimize this anomalous system by three 
related models: first, a contractual model, second, a property model and third an entity 
theory that confuses the corporation with individual citizens.  All three models portray 
corporations in ways that make them appear private–more like citizens than government–
and powerless. 
1.  Contract and market metaphors
The contractual model contends that corporations are private entities of concern 
mainly to those who contract with them.  As Easterbrook and Fischel put it, “[b]ecause 
the choices do not impose costs on strangers to the contracts, what is optimal for the 
firms and investors is optimal for society.”9  Since corporations (on this model) appear 
purely voluntary, the appropriate role of the state is merely to enforce private agreements.  
In the most consistent form of the contractual model, the corporation tends to lose its 
corporeality: It is described as a mere nexus of contracts and dissolves into a moment in 
the market.10
The model of corporate law as contract is misleading on several levels.  Perhaps 
most fundamentally, it trades on a simplistic and ideologically driven portrait of contract.  
In the corporate law model, contracts are fully negotiated free bargains between equals.  
But in the real world, bargains are rarely between equals, voluntariness is always a matter 
of degree, most terms are assumed or presumed rather than negotiated, and many 
agreements do “impose costs on strangers.”  For this reason, contract law in general is 
highly interventionist, and the contracts of most interest to ordinary citizens are highly 
8For some preliminary thoughts on the substance of the debate, see Daniel JH Greenwood, Beyond the Counter-
Majoritarian Difficulty, 53 RUTGERS L. REV. 781 (2001) <http://www.law.utah.edu/greenwood/html/Rutgers.htm> 
(beginning to explain the theory of democracy as partnership), Enronitis, supra n.  (discussing the contradictory 
requirements of corporate law and how to reform them).
9FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 6 (1991).  
10See, e.g.,  Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403 
(1985) and Bill Bratton’s duo: William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from 
History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1989) and William W. Bratton, Jr., The "Nexus of Contracts" Corporation: A Critical 
Appraisal,  74 CORNELL L. REV. 407 (1989).  See also, Bratton’s The Economic Structure of the Post-contractual 
Corporation,  87 NW. U. L.REV. 180 (1992) (reviewing Easterbrook & Fischel). 
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mediated by substantive law.  Consumer, loan, insurance and employment contracts are 
read (to the extent that they are written at all) in light of strong substantive policies 
developed by both legislatures and courts.11
In contrast, corporate law is not interventionist at all.  The process by which 
corporate law is made, especially the right of corporations to choose their own law, 
means that states do not impose substantive values in corporation law “contracts” to 
protect weaker contracting parties, let alone the many non-contracting parties deeply 
affected by corporate law’s background rules.  Were a state to try to introduce such 
values into corporate law, the stronger bargaining party would simply cause the 
corporation to use a different state’s law.12
Theorists of the contractual model have largely conceded that state corporate law 
cannot impose protection on parties to the corporate contract.  Instead, they have argued 
that the market participants will insist on law that adequately protects them.  The 
contractual model, then, is not so much a claim that corporate law is like contract law—it 
clearly is not.  Rather, it is a claim that the economic markets in which corporations 
participate will generate the appropriate legal regulation or guidance by their own 
processes.  Market results, however, are always heavily mediated by market regulation; 
here, paradoxically, the claim is that the regulated market will generate its own proper 
regulation. 
This market/contract model’s claim to solve the democratic problem is false.  
Democracies have long known that markets can be tools for good or ill.  That is why we 
attempt to suppress markets in, for example, protection rackets or cocaine.  And markets 
generally fail to account for important values that are not reflected in price.  That is why 
we have environmental regulations, child labor laws, tort law and criminal law.  Markets 
also tend to contain incentives to self-destruction.  That is why successful markets are 
surrounded by effective disclosure requirements, bars on fraud, and bans on monopoly.   
To allow a market–or a firm recharacterized as a market–to set its own rules is unlikely to 
reach results satisfactory to a self-governing people.13  Or so we have presumed since the 
demise of Lochner. 
2.  Property metaphors
  The second model uses the metaphor of property: A corporation is 
conceptualized as an asset–a thing–owned by an individual (or a group of individuals, a 
difference not seen as meaningful).  As a subset of property law, corporation law is seen, 
11See, GRANT GILMORE, DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974).
12For further discussion of the mechanisms of the race to the top/bottom, see Daniel JH Greenwood,  The Mysterious Race 
to the Top/Bottom, 2005 YALE L. & POL. REV., http://www.law.utah.edu/greenwood/html/Mysterious.htm.
13For further discussion, see generally, Daniel JH Greenwood, Fictional Shareholders: ‘For Whom is the Corporation 
Managed,’ Revisited, 69 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1021 (1996), 
http://www.law.utah.edu/greenwood/hmtl/FictionalShareholders.htm; Daniel JH Greenwood, Essential Speech: Why 
Corporate Speech Is Not Free, 83 IOWA L. REV. 995 (1998), 
http://www.law.utah.edu/greenwood/html/EssentialSpeech.htm.  
© Daniel J.H. Greenwood
Preliminary Draft - Not For Publication 3/05
11
then, as largely about agency issues: corporations are property managed by agents and the 
central issue is only whether the agents are acting in the interests of their principals.  
This agency/property concept of the private corporation conflicts with the 
contractual/market model–agents are fiduciaries, governed by different norms than the 
ethics of the contractual marketplace14– but it shares with it the underlying claim that 
corporate law does not affect the rest of us.  By portraying corporations as property, it 
suggests that protecting corporations is protecting the property-owners, and thus a system 
of law that allows corporations to choose precisely the protection they want is not 
problematic (or is problematic only to the extent that corporate agents use corporate law 
to lessen their obligations toward the “owners”). 
The property/agency model fails, however, to answer the democratic claim for 
two reasons.  First, the “property” in question is fundamentally a set of social relations 
among people, many of whom are not parties to the alleged agent/principal relationship. 
Second, the metaphor conflicts with the law.  Shareholders own shares, not the 
corporation.  The shareholders, viewed alternately as principals or property owners, lack 
most of the rights ordinarily associated with either.  As a consequence, the corporate 
agents lack a principal and the corporate property lacks an owner, so that protecting the 
corporation does not protect the humans associated with it, even those this theory 
characterizes as “owners.”15
3.  Individual person metaphors
Third, corporations are often conceptualized as individuals.  In one variant, the 
firm is ignored altogether, reduced to the individuals thought to make it up (usually the 
shareholders, rather than the people who actually act for it), and it is assumed, without 
evidence, that the individuals and the entity are the same, or at least share interests.  In 
the other variant, the firm itself is seen as an individual, as if it itself were a citizen to be 
protected from government and entitled to participate in the governing process, rather 
than a tool of the citizenry not dissimilar from the government itself.  These two models–
the aggregate and entity theories of corporate personality–are seen as radically opposed in 
the academic literature, and for some purposes they are.  But in their most common 
forms, each sees the firm as  an “intermediate institution” that must be protected to 
protect citizens and civil society from the state.16
On the aggregate view, protecting the corporation is seen as no more than 
shorthand for protecting the individual citizens (or shareholders) whom it “really” is.  But 
this theory of corporate personality should be strikingly unpersuasive in a liberal 
democracy: just as liberal theory attacks the notion that the state can be identified with 
14Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458 (1928); see discussion in Enronitis, supra n. ; Mysterious Race, supra n.  (at Aktie 
Fn).
15For a fuller explication of this claim, see generally, Fictional Shareholders, supra n. .
16See, ALEXIS DE TOQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, Bk 2, Ch VII (discussing importance to democratic regimes of 
intermediate institutions and civil society).
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the citizens who make it up, so too it should question the naive idea that the corporation 
and its “citizens” can be conflated.17
In contrast, the entity model treats the firm itself as a citizen.  Thus, it harks back 
to the pre-democratic view of the state as composed of estates or corporations each 
entitled to rights independent of (and often in opposition to) rights of the individuals who 
compose them.  Like a medieval church or university, modern corporations maintain 
internal disciplinary and justice systems that are largely unreviewed by and independent 
of the state system.  Paradoxically, then, this private model of the corporation claims to 
justify granting the corporation state-like powers.  
The corporation as a state-within-the-state, however, can not be justified under 
any democratic theory, because this state-like entity defies all democratic norms 
internally.  No corporation operates by the principle of one person, one vote.  All 
economically significant corporations disenfranchise a substantial portion of the affected 
populace, while even shareholders vote according to the number of shares they hold. 
Moreover, standard corporate law sharply limits the control that even the “voters” have 
over “their” entity.  The law bars them, in the absence of unanimous consent, from 
making fundamental value choices, such as for example, from balancing the pursuit of 
profit against other potential corporate goals (such as quality products, interests of non-
shareholder participants or even the actual financial interests of the real human beings 
who own the shares).  Moreover, it  even bars them from electing directors pledged to 
particular interests: Directors, unlike ordinary politicians, are bound by law to pursue the 
interests of all (and only) shares, and courts will enforce this duty (subject to the often 
significant limitations of the business judgment rule) at the behest of any shareholder 
regardless of election results.18  Theorists, therefore, usually resort to market-based 
explanations of why the corporation is unable to exert any power over its shareholders, 
employees and other participants.
The entity model must fail for the same reason as the aggregate model: 
Corporations are tools of human beings, not values in themselves.  They are, that is, state-
like rather than citizen-like.  And their lack of internal democracy means that they have 
only weak claims to be alternative representative institutions in a federal or pluralistic 
system.  
4. The metaphors of powerlessness
17For exploration of the likelihood of extreme differences between the actions of corporations and the desires of their 
participants, see generally, Fictional Shareholders, supra n. .
18See Fictional Shareholders, supra n. .  Compare, John J. Brennan & Edward C. Johnson 3d, No Disclosure: The Feeling 
Is Mutual, 1/14/2003 WALL ST. J. A14 (Chairman and CEO of Fidelity and Vanguard mutual fund groups argue that 
institutional shareholders should be allowed to vote in shareholder elections without disclosing their votes to their own 
shareholders, so as to preserve their ability to exclude all considerations other than “the financial interests of our clients” 
(apparently understanding their clients as having no financial or non-financial interests other than their shareholdings in the 
mutual funds)); compare Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del 1985) (barring directors 
from considering interests of bondholders in approving sale of company, even where bondholders and shareholders were 
largely the same people).
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Each of these metaphors takes much of its power from an underlying economic 
theory combining elements of all of them.  In standard micro-economic theory, 
corporations are sometimes viewed as mere black boxes subject to consumer sovereignty 
through the product market, and therefore not power loci at all.  If a corporation has no 
choice but to follow the market, the argument runs, then its internal organization is of no 
importance; corporate economic actors will behave the same as individual ones.  In a 
reasonably competitive market, only the lowest cost producers will survive.19
Accordingly, corporations will be compelled (if only the state will allow them) to adopt 
the lowest cost organizational form (including the lowest-cost corporate law).  
The “genius” of the American system, then, is that  the corporation’s right to 
choose its state of incorporation creates a market for laws: an interstate competition 
which, in turn, precludes meddlesome reformers from imposing unnecessary costs on 
corporate organizational form.20  In this model, then, the corporation is seen as a purely 
economic actor, important mainly as a producer of consumer goods, and properly subject 
to purely economic forces.  The necessary conclusion is - that corporate law is best which 
governs least.  Corporate law should simply allow the market free rein (or should it be 
reign?).  Our competitive federalism does just that.  To the extent that this model holds, 
corporate law is largely irrelevant and uninteresting.  The only socially important 
regulation of corporate law will be by the product market itself; the only socially 
important law will be regulation of the underlying product market, not of corporations.21
The argument is, in short, that political democracy is unnecessary because market control 
is sufficient.  
But to state the argument in this way is to point to its implausibility: We have 
long since rejected the notion that unregulated markets can even exist, let alone that they 
19As Doug Kysar has recently pointed out, consumer markets are often legally structured so as to limit consumers’ ability 
to influence the processes by which products are made, as opposed to the final product itself.  Douglas Kysar, Preferences 
for Processes:  The Process/Product Distinction and the Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 525 (2004).  
Just as first generation civil rights law attempts to force markets to ignore the status relations of market participants–to 
make Black money or work indifferentiable from White money or work–so too trade and other disclosure regulations make 
it difficult or impossible for consumers to distinguish between products produced with or without pollution, sound 
employee relations, appropriate respect for the spirit of the law and obligations of citizenship,  Frankenscience, or other 
controversial processes.  As in the standard models of introductory economics, the corporation is a black box, the internal 
workings of which remain inviolate.  But as second generation civil rights activists routinely point out, this invisibility–
useful as it is in attacking pre-modern status hierarchies–also conceals other important power relations.  Minority groups 
usually want their differences respected, not merely rendered invisible. See, e.g., Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Gendered 
Workers/Market Equality, 12 TEX.  J. WOMEN & L. 323 (2003);  Karen Engle, The Persistence of Neutrality: the Failure of 
the Religious Accommodation Provision to Redeem Title VII, 76 TEX. L. REV. 317 (1996).  Consumers, similarly,  might 
care whether their food is produced with child labor, GMOs, pesticides or bovine growth hormones even if no residues 
show up in the final product–but courts commonly view such interests as illegitimate.  See, e.g., International Dairy Foods 
Ass'n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67 (1996); Daniel JH Greenwood, First Amendment Imperialism (a response to Michael 
Walzer’s Leary Lecture), 1999 UTAH L.REV. 659 (1999); Kysar, supra..
20See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993); Bernard Black, Is Corporate Law 
Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 542 (1990).
21Taken seriously, this model would require that corporations be barred from influencing the substantive regulation of the 
product market.  See, Essential Speech, supra n. .
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inevitably lead to the best of all possible worlds (or even to a better world than a market 
limited and guided by politically plausible regulation).  More fundamentally, the line 
between market and democracy is, in a democracy, one for democratic politics to 
determine, and so the “genius” of a system that lets the market decide when politics 
should apply is anti-republican and anti-democratic.
Each of these metaphors tends to distract attention from the basic democratic 
issue: corporations, which are not citizens, choose their own law.  In a democracy, 
however, citizens must govern themselves and that includes controlling their social and 
economic creations.   Americans have abdicated that self-governing function to a self-
replicating legal  structure that, following its own legally mandated norms, chooses the 
law that regulates it.  This is neither democracy nor consumer sovereignty but a golem: a 
creature we created to be our servant that we are, instead, allowing to govern us.22
C.  The Value of Democracy
Democracy is not, however, the only value in our politics.  There might be good 
reasons for voters to choose to disenfranchise themselves, choosing the evolutionary 
model of corporate law over the deliberative-voting model of standard democratic law.  
For example, sometimes goals are best arrived at indirectly: Perhaps there is reason to 
believe that the non-democratic process of corporate law will produce results that would 
be more likely to be approved by a democratic process than a direct democratic process 
will.  Or perhaps the non-democratic process is fairer for some reason than a democratic 
one.  Or perhaps it is more likely to fulfill some other goal–such as wealth creation–to 
such a degree that a democratic decision would decide to restrict democracy.  The 
peculiar anti-democratic status of corporate law, however, requires a special justification.
In the next sections I consider possible democratic arguments for this anti-
democratic system.  The conclusion, however, is that when we proceed beyond the 
rhetoric of private right, none of the available public defenses suffice. 
II.  The Political Critique 
Were corporations citizens–the subjects and objects of a political system–our 
system of free choice of law for corporations would be an extraordinarily attractive 
solution to long standing problems in democratic theory.  Corporations, and firms more 
generally, choose their own law quite free of external pressures and thus under conditions 
of freedom and non-coercion rarely found among democratic communities.  Thus, taking 
corporations as entitled to the freedom and respect of citizens, corporate law could be 
described as the ultimate liberal solution to the problem of governmental coercion.  But 
corporations are not citizens, and there is no reason in democratic theory, and little reason 
in any other context, why they should be treated as if they were.  Firms are human tools 
22For a fuller discussion of the significance of market and voting in democratic governance, see Beyond the Counter-
Majoritarian Difficulty, supra n. .
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created for human purposes; they ought to be created, regulated or given rights only to 
the extent that they serve those human purposes.23
Our publicly traded corporations are a major locus of power in society today.   
Measured by the wealth they control, the major firms are far larger than most 
governmental units.  Measured by the degree to which they affect our lives, corporate 
decisions designing and delivering cars, clothes, word processors, telephone service or
electricity have at least as much impact as do most local governmental activities.  In 
terms of coercion, it is easier to escape local governmental taxation than to avoid paying 
fees to corporations such as Microsoft, cable companies or major food processors; 
hospital bills are more likely to threaten our way of life than governmental traffic tickets.  
Those who work for major corporations are subject to a degree of potential 
violation of privacy that no governmental unit could contemplate: employers are 
permitted to monitor e-mail and phone conversations routinely, employees have no 
expectation of privacy with respect to their employers in their desks or medical records.  
For many people, losing a job or pension would be more traumatic than any encounter 
they are likely to have with the government.  Corporate legal decisions–for example, to 
change seniority rules or reorganize production, switch types of pension plan, deny 
customers the right to share the software or music they have purchased or to commandeer 
portions of their hard drives for corporate purposes–can be profoundly determinative of 
important aspects of our lives.  Even on the simplest measure, the ability to wield 
physical force, corporations are as powerful as other governmental units: private security 
forces employ more people than public police departments.
Traditional liberal theory teaches that we ought to be suspicious of government 
even in a democracy.  Just because the government is responsive to the majority doesn’t 
mean (simple readings of Rousseau notwithstanding) that it will consistently act in our 
individual or even collective interests.24  American law treats corporations as if they were 
private bulwarks of power protecting us from the government: Thus, the Supreme Court 
has granted corporations constitutional rights to due process, free speech and so on, but 
refused to give us constitutional rights against them.25 Popular culture has not always 
23Although this article argues that corporations are not citizens and should not be treated as if they were, the point is not 
entirely non-controversial. See e.g., Kevin Groves, No Vote For Corporations in B.C., 52 THE MUSE, 3/22/02 (describing 
attempt to allow corporations to vote in municipal elections); Good corporate citizens or devil, STARTUP May 2002 
(quoting Jack Peake, Mayor of Lake Cowichan, BC, in connection with his proposal to grant corporations the vote, “It 
seemed to be reaction by people who see devils in corporations and don’t want them to have a person’s rights”). [note to 
editors: these two articles are on the internet; if you can’t find them, you could substitute Aurora Inst. Corporations could 
get the right to vote in B.C., Canada Newswire 3/7/02 (available on Lexis/Nexis), which is less colorful but describes the 
attempt].  
24See, e.g., JOHN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, chs 3, 6 (Everyman Edition at 27, 37) (describing 
circumstances under which the will of all might become the general will).  Rousseau often seems quite pessimistic 
regarding the possibility of this near miraculous occurrence, which, he believes, is the essential foundation of freedom.  
Few nations will be free, and not often for long.  Id., ch 7(Everyman at 38) (legislator must transform  man’s nature to 
create freedom).
25Santa Clara v. Southern Pacific R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886) (holding, without explanation,  corporations to be 
protected persons within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment); Connecticut General Life Insurance Co. v. Johnson, 
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made such a sharp distinction: big government and big corporations, private and public 
bureaucracies, Washington and Wall Street often have been seen as indistinguishable 
enemies by populists of various varieties at least since the Jacksonian Era. 
In my view, publicly traded corporations are far more analogous to government 
than to citizen.  Like governments, they are basically bureaucratic enterprises performing 
a mission that may be given to them in some loose sense by the population as a whole, 
but which permits plenty of room for independent and potentially heavy-handed action.   
This is the issue in this section: Is protecting corporations, by granting them the 
right to choose their own law, a way of protecting citizens, as conventional theory often 
suggests?  Or, on the contrary, is allowing corporations to choose their own law closely 
analogous to allowing governmental units to choose their own law–that is, to escape from 
democratic control?   If the latter, democratic republicans should be quite suspicious of 
the race to the bottom/top regardless of the efficacy of the particular results it reaches at 
any given time.  Just as enlightened despotism remains despotic even if the despot really 
is enlightened, so too the decision to free a major governmental unit from popular control 
ought to be scary even if it does not seem to be substantively problematic at the moment.  
Corporate  leaders, unlike judges and governmental bureaucrats, are not appointed by 
elected officials or answerable to them.  To the extent that corporate law is determined by 
the race to the bottom/top, corporate managers do not even nominally follow norms set 
by the democratic process.  They are, rather, analogous to autonomous self-perpetuating 
power structures: a sort of open aristocracy.
A.  Corporate Law as Ideal Liberal Freedom: the entity theory
Two contrary senses in which corporate law seems to meet the requirements of 
liberal theory need to be distinguished.  In this section, I discuss the entity theory.
Entity theory contends that the corporation itself is a citizen, entitled to a set of 
rights that go along with being a moral being entitled to  respect and legal recognition.  
The theory’s power rests on two pillars.  First, corporations are entities, even if not 
citizens, and legal system does in fact grant them many rights of citizens.  This 
combination of sociological and legal reality gives the normative claim a certain surface 
plausibility: If corporations are rights-bearing entities (and they are), perhaps they should 
be.  Paradoxically, the fact that we give corporations rights they shouldn’t have makes it 
appear reasonable to view them as the type of being that ought to have rights. 
Second, if corporations were citizens, corporate law would grant them a type of 
freedom to which we all aspire.  The internal affairs doctrine gives corporations, unlike 
human citizens, the right to choose their own law.  That right, in turn, is one of the 
fundamental Western understandings of freedom.  
303 U.S. 77 (1937) (Black dissent) (questioning whether citizens ought to have rights against corporations under some 
circumstances); Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562 (1949) (Douglas dissent  and Jackson's separate opinion) 
(further debating the issue).  
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The metaphor of citizenship thus powerfully supports the Delaware system.  But 
the metaphor deceives.  Corporations are not humans or ends in themselves.  They are 
tools for our economic advancement; they shouldn’t be treated as ultimate values any 
more than governments should be.  As a normative matter, the metaphor is simply 
deceptive.  
Since Hobbes, liberalism’s ultimate defense of a limited government’s right to 
coerce has been based on the claim that there is no “real” coercion, because in a just 
society, we can see the subject as having chosen the law at issue, or can say that the 
subject rationally should have chosen it in a fair bargain.  That is, the subject either has 
consented in an actual agreement at least tacitly,26 or rationally would consent in an 
hypothetical ideal agreement.27
The hypothetical rational agreement is embodied in the state of nature or its 
modern analogue, Rawls’ original position, and the emergence of government from it.  
On this view,  governments should limit themselves to matters which rational individuals 
in a fair bargaining position (such as the state of nature) would have approved.  The 
power of this argument depends, of course, on the persuasiveness of the description of the 
conditions under which rational individuals would bargain and on the rationality of the 
bargain they would have made.  For this reason, hypothetical consent arguments are often 
controversial. 
In contrast, tacit consent arguments usually are variants on the position of the 
Laws of Athens as set out in Plato’s Apology: A subject who does not emigrate (and in 
Locke’s version, owns land), has tacitly consented to the laws as they stand.28
The problem with this theory of tacit consent is that the agreement it describes 
looks too coercive, too much like a contract of adhesion.  In order to disapprove of an 
unjust law, the dissenting Socrates or his Lockean equivalent must accept exile.  
Emigration, however, is quite difficult (even leaving aside the sometimes fatal problem 
that it is impossible unless some other country is prepared to permit immigration29 ).  
Emigres must leave behind their country, friends and relatives, often their culture and 
language, jobs or profession.  Indeed, Socrates argues that hemlock is preferable to exile.  
In short, to refuse consent requires so high a price that little moral value can be placed on 
a subject’s failure to pay it.30
26See generally, ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974) (arguing that just state is one in which status quo 
is result of just agreements changing a just starting point);  ROBERT PAUL WOLFF, IN DEFENSE OF ANARCHY (arguing that 
just state requires continuing consent); ROUSSEAU, supra n.  (arguing that in just state law follows general will).
27See generally, JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1974) (arguing that just state is one that imaginary participants in a 
hypothetical fair state of ignorance rationally would agree to); POLITICAL LIBERALISM (setting out requirements for non-
coercive state).
28PLATO, APOLOGY (presenting argument that accepting the benefits of the laws requires supporting them even when they 
are wrong); JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT (basing legitimacy on tacit agreement of subjects).
29See generally, HANNAH ARENDT, ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM (arguing that the stateless are free of all human rights 
and, ultimately, freed of humanity, even life itself).
30
 Compare the Sinai midrash of Babylonian Talmud Shabbat 88a (translated in MICHAEL WALZER et al., I THE JEWISH 
POLITICAL TRADITION 28 (2001), discussed in Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty, supra n.  at 792-3 n12), which interprets an 
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Of course, no actual government is the product of actual consent or meets the 
requirements that would be generated by hypothetical consent, if consent is taken even 
half-seriously.  But corporations choose their (constitutive) law more freely and with 
fewer constraints than any human citizen.  Citizens are limited to voting for 
representatives and, if they cannot accept the decisions the government makes for them, 
can only go into exile. 
In contrast, corporations have far more freedom.  
First, corporate constitutive law is remarkably flexible.  Human citizens normally 
are allowed to organize their families in only a limited set of pre-established 
relationships.  Standard corporate law, in contrast, is open to all sorts of unusual 
arrangements; virtually all of its key requirements are merely default rules, waivable at 
the option of the individual firm or its participants.31  Even when the statute does not 
explicitly provide that its rules are optional, it is often relatively easy to plan around 
them.  For example, corporate law begins with a presumption of a separation between 
equity ownership and management; with a presumption of entity-level taxation, and a 
presumption that corporate funds are available for corporate creditors before corporate 
investors.  But the leveraged buyouts of the 1980s created corporations that avoided all 
three of these apparently compulsory aspects of corporate law even within the confines of 
the traditional statutes.  By refinancing with high debt and low equity, firms were able to 
give high equity ownership (and associated votes) to managers, to virtually eliminate the 
corporate income tax (since most profits were paid out in the form of interest, deductible 
to the firm), and to ensure that investors (now classified as senior debt holders) received 
the first, instead of the last, claim on corporate income.  
Second, any firm that determines that its host state’s corporate law is 
insufficiently flexible to allow the firm to do what it wants to do can simply reincorporate 
elsewhere.  The Internal Affairs Doctrine, accepted in general terms by every American 
state, eliminates the usual choice of law rule that a state applies its own law to its citizens 
and to economic activity within its boundaries.  Instead, corporations may incorporate 
anywhere they choose, with no requirement of any other relationship with the 
incorporating state.  No American state allows families to choose to follow the child 
protection law of another state just because the family decision-maker thinks that law 
odd preposition in the description of the events leading up to the giving of the Law at Sinai to mean that  God threatened to 
bury the people under Mt. Sinai if they did not agree to his Law.  The midrash points out that if God threatened the people 
of Israel with destruction at Sinai, then their consent to his covenant is not legally binding.  Some readers respond  by 
seeking some other time or place where consent might be given, either mythologically (as in the Book of Esther) or 
sociologically (taking consent to emerge from practice and sometimes explicitly holding that the law is binding because the 
actual people in actual communities accept the actual interpretations or interpreters) or both (as in the story of the oven of 
Akhnai, see  Daniel JH Greenwood, Akhnai, 1997 UTAH LAW REVIEW 309-358 (1997) 
<http://www.law.utah.edu/greenwood/html/Akhnai.htm>); others, particularly in the high Middle Ages, contended that 
God’s rule, at least, requires no consent. 
31See discussion supra at III.B.1.b.
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better; by accepting the Internal Affairs Doctrine they give corporations precisely that 
right.  
Moreover, there seems to be no reason to worry about problems of monopoly in 
either suppliers or consumers of corporate law, despite recent suggestions that Delaware 
may have a commanding lead.32  On the contrary, the “market” for corporate law is 
characterized by extreme competition.  Corporate managers acting on behalf of 
corporations may choose among 50 state jurisdictions as well as, in most cases, foreign 
corporate law regimes.   
It is true that the state incorporation statutes tend to cluster–at any given time, 
they mostly look alike, and when innovations are introduced, they tend to quickly spread 
or be eliminated, so that at any given time the range of choice may appear narrow.  But 
this sort of “punctuated equilibrium,” in which periods of stability alternate with change 
that spreads rapidly through a population, is characteristic of biological evolution as well 
as developed markets and not necessarily a sign of lack of competition.  Indeed, most 
competitive markets rapidly settle on a dominant paradigm with variation limited to a few 
characteristics. 
Third, the apparent lack of variation in corporate law is largely illusory.  Unlike 
in biological evolution, market competitors are never entirely locked in by their history.  
A species must adapt to its immediate environment, even if it might be more successful 
adopting a different one; it can only climb the hill in front of it, not the larger one after 
the next valley.  Firms, in contrast, are led by managers who can consciously decide to 
change the terms of competition.  Accordingly, firms have options that would not be 
available in a natural selection.  
If particular, if no corporate law meets the firm’s desires, it can organize under a 
variety of alternative business forms.  Firms need not elect to be governed by corporate 
32See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk, Vigourous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering the Competition Over Corporate Charters, 
112 YALE L.J. 553 (2002) (empirical evidence suggests strong incentives to incorporate in Delaware).  Probably the most 
important non-substantive reason to incorporate in Delaware is that everyone else does it.  This cascade creates significant 
information benefits.  First, because most major corporations use Delaware, there is more litigation in Delaware courts, 
more discussion of Delaware statutes, and simply more Delaware law.  This presumably makes Delaware law somewhat 
more predictable, understandable or at least more structured than the less developed law of other states.  In Delaware, 
unlike Utah, it is likely that something resembling your problem has already happened.  Second, because Delaware law has 
the status of national corporate law, corporate attorneys throughout the country are likely to know and understand it, often 
as the only corporate law they know other than their own local law.  Delaware law thus serves as the national “second 
language,” similar to English as the language of international commerce.  By adopting it as its first language, a corporation 
assures that its structure is understandable to everyone.  
Delaware incorporation may also have useful signaling effect.  By adopting Delaware law, a way for a firm, 
particularly one newly entering the capital market, can signal to investors its commitment to the national market.  Like a 
budding professional seeking experience in the big city, a firm signals that it is prepared to play in the big leagues by 
incorporating in Delaware.
These reasons to prefer Delaware law, however, seem insufficient to lead a firm to decide to incorporate in 
Delaware despite significant unhappiness with its substantive law.  Predictable and understandable law is clearly a benefit, 
but if the predictable and understandable law were unattractive law, surely many would decide they’d prefer to take their 
chances elsewhere.  So, it seems safe to assume that the overwhelming choice of national corporations to incorporate in 
Delaware reflects corporate decision-makers’ genuine choice and consent.
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law at all.  Public firms can go private or vice versa; for-profits can reorganize in mutual 
and cooperative forms, the various forms of trust, partnerships, limited liability 
companies, even wholly-owned sole proprietorships (incorporated or not).  
Entity liability can be effectively replaced outside the corporate form using 
secured interests, as Lynn LoPucki has pointed out33 or using trusts, as John Langbein has 
suggested.34
Funding need not be raised in the stock market; junk bonds can provide a 
functionally similar–though legally quite different–alternative.  Indeed, at one point, 
leading corporate theorists pronounced the public corporate form dead, predicting that 
closely-held, highly leveraged firms with purportedly superior managerial incentives 
would compete public corporations out of existence.35
33See, e.g., Lynn LoPucki, The Irrefutable Logic of Judgment Proofing, 52 STANF. L. REV. 55, 62 (1999) (demonstrating 
that judgment proofing enables corporations to avoid tort liability and skews investment decisions); Lynn LoPucki, The 
Death of Contract, 106 YALE L.J. 1 (1996) (describing mechanisms for creating effective judgment proofing).  LoPucki 
argues that the alternative forms are sufficiently fungible that it would be virtually impossible for any state today to 
significantly restrict limited liability.  Limited liability remains the major attraction of the corporate form for small firms; 
although access to the capital markets may be more important for large ones.  LoPucki’s work thus suggests that even a 
concerted effort of the states to impose regulatory content on corporate law would probably fail relatively quickly with 
respect to small firms, since such firms would abandon the corporate form for other forms of organization with different 
ways of limiting their liability.  A debt-financed firm with an insolvent equity owner effectively has limited liability even if 
the equity owner is liable for the firm’s obligations.  The planning task, therefore, is to create debt-financing with both 
priority over later contract and tort creditors and sufficient flexibility to avoid crippling the firm prematurely in the event of 
a temporary or cyclical business setback, while offering financiers sufficient potential return to compensate for the 
remaining risk borne.  Capital suppliers who fund the firm through something like a renegotiable senior bond at an 
unrealistically high interest rate can extract most of the returns to capital without much risk of liability for firm delicts.  See 
LoPucki, supra.   
Some commentators have suggested, for this reason, that it would be impossible to eliminate limited liability for 
torts.  See, Joseph Grundfest, The Limited Future of Unlimited Liability: A Capital Markets Perspective, 102 YALE L.J.
387, 421 (1992), but see, Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Do the Capital Markets Compel Limited Liability? A 
Response to Professor Grundfest, 102 YALE L.J. 427, 430 (1992) (defending proposal that corporate shareholders have pro 
rata liability for torts).  This article’s thesis suggests that Hansmann & Kraakman’s proposals will be stillborn so long as 
corporate law remains immune from ordinary political discourse.  
On the other hand, it seems likely that a determined and centralized regulator could impose a mandatory form of 
organization on firms that seek access to the public capital markets, on larger capitalization firms or those employing 
significant numbers, especially if we were able to overcome the fetishism of form.  Thus, we have succeeded in imposing 
entity level taxation and securities regulation on publicly traded firms, and substantial employee regulation on even 
relatively small firms in the Civil Rights area, while the Germans have successfully mandated particular forms of 
organization, including employee rights, on large capitalization firms.  
34See, e.g., John Langbein, The Secret Life of the Trust, 107 YALE L.J. 165, 167-78 (1997).  Trusts, of course, were widely 
used to evade bars on merger contained in corporate law prior to the great reform begun by New Jersey; hence the oddity 
that our anti-monopoly law is known as the Anti-Trust Act.  Today, most REITs and about half the mutual funds use the 
trust rather than the corporate form, apparently in order to avoid some of the few remaining regulatory requirements of 
corporate form: the annual meeting, a specified number of shares and the corporate franchise tax.  Langbein, id, at 171, 
184, 187 & n.133.  Langbein suggests that the business trust offers virtually the same limited liability protection as the 
corporation, without entity taxation, and thus leaves an interesting puzzle, namely why there are any corporations at all.  
The obvious answer–that people prefer paying taxes to filling out tax forms–suggests that tax reform efforts ought to focus 
on replacing the income tax, at least for the middle class, with a VAT requiring no forms at all, while reserving the more 
complicated income tax only for those with enough income to have significant savings (perhaps the most affluent 5%).
35See, e.g., Michael Jensen, The Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1989.
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While that particular prediction seems overblown in retrospect, corporate lawyers 
remain heavily employed in shifting firms, or parts of firms, among various types of legal 
entities.  The regular oscillation between conglomeration or consolidation and 
deconglomeration or downsizing fads in various industries regularly take publicly traded 
companies private (as divisions of public companies), later spin them off as free standing 
public companies, before taking them private in management led buyouts, only, in the 
next stock market boom, to go public once again.  More radically, Mesa Petroleum 
reorganized as a publicly traded limited partnership and then, after tax reform reduced the 
attractiveness of the LP form, it reverted to corporate form.
For many years, business planners assumed that there were four or five principal 
characteristics of corporate form which to a large extent could be achieved only in a 
package by incorporation: centralized management, eternal life, limited liability, free 
transferability of economic interests and entity taxation.  Much business planning was 
devoted to the difficult task of obtaining at least some of the former four characteristics 
without the fifth.  But these legal characteristics of the corporation have been entirely 
deconstructed:  any combination of the corporate characteristics is available outside the 
corporate form.  With the advent of the limited liability company, even the IRS has given 
up and now accepts that entity taxation is entirely voluntary for all firms unless they 
choose to have their securities publicly listed.  With the increasing sophistication of the 
private placement market, it is no longer–if it ever was–impractical for even quite large 
firms to remain private. 
Similarly, the firm’s underlying investors can readily switch their investments to 
different corporations or, in most cases, to different organizational forms.   Few investors 
are required to remain in any given firm or even in the market for corporate securities 
itself (and the few that might be, such as mutual funds, have asset bases that could 
themselves disappear if the underlying human investors became unhappy with corporate 
investment).  As technological cycles accelerate and physical capital has an ever shorter 
life span, it is increasingly easy to redeploy capital by the simple (and virtually 
unregulable) expedient of reinvesting profits elsewhere.  Thus, both corporate managers 
and investors appear to face a wide range of choices that, within the constraints of the 
Internal Affairs Doctrine, is difficult for a state legal regime to restrict.
Finally, if a corporation changes its mind–determines that the law it previously 
organized under is no longer in its interests–it is free to reorganize elsewhere, again with 
little or no collateral costs.  Reincorporation in a different state usually requires little 
more than filing a piece of paper and paying a relatively small fee.36
Under these circumstances, Locke’s tacit consent looks far closer to real consent.  
Since corporations have readily available and relatively inexpensive alternatives to 
36First, of course, the corporation must decide to reorganize, which under standard American corporate law will require a 
vote of its board of directors followed by a vote of its shareholders.  These costs are trivial by comparison with the costs of 
genuine emigration.  
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compliance with the law of the local authorities, acceptance of that law is reasonably 
understood as not merely tacit consent but something much stronger.  The same can 
never be true for human citizens, who always have non-legal constraints tying them to a 
particular citizenship.
In short,  it appears possible for nearly any firm to pick and choose not only 
among different corporation statutes but among a far wider full range of business forms: 
corporate law has no unique benefits to offer and therefore, virtually no coercive power at 
all.  Since firms have so many alternatives within corporate law and need not subject 
themselves to corporate law at all, business organizations law meets the liberal demand of 
non-coercion.  On this view, then, corporate law appears close to the liberal ideal of an 
entirely voluntary, non-coercive state.
Superficially attractive as it is, this theory is nonsense.  Corporations have no 
claim to human rights; firms are not repositories of intrinsic human value.  There is no 
reason why firms should be free of human or political coercion–on the contrary, they are 
merely tools for the pursuit of human happiness, entitled on liberal grounds to no more or 
less a priori respect than that other tool of human happiness, the state.  
The image of the corporation as a citizen replaces argument with metaphor in 
order to reverse the burden of proof.  By pretending that corporations are citizens, it 
suggests that they should be free.  But we should not be fooled.  An argument is 
necessary to explain why firms should be regulated, freed from regulation, or even 
allowed to exist.  The value of free choice of law by corporations, if any, is purely 
derivative of some consequences to humans, and any theoretical defense of granting 
liberal citizenship to corporations must make that connection. 
In the final analysis, then, entity theory is rhetorically powerful because it invites 
us to imagine  corporations as citizens.  Were corporations citizens, granting corporations 
rights, such as the right to choose their own law, would be the same thing as granting 
citizens rights.  As a trick, this is a quite elegant use of framing, in the sense explained by 
the cognitive bias theories.  But as an argument, it fails.  By anthropomorphizing the 
firm, this firm-as-citizen or corporatist theory ducks the difficult question, which is to 
determine how best to use corporations to promote human interests.
B.  Corporate Law as Ideal Liberal Freedom: consumer 
sovereignty and the corporation as aggregate
To avoid the problem of the anthropomorphized corporation, the obvious 
solution is to break down the firm into its component parts.  Standard corporate theory 
does this by the aggregate theory.  This approach relies on a metaphor of a firm as a 
coalition of shareholders who have hired a manager/CEO (or, occasionally, the reverse: a 
CEO who has hired himself or sold his company to shareholders).   The rights of the 
corporation, then, are understood as rights of shareholders and/or managers.  This second 
defense of corporate citizenship, then, is the opposite of the one discussed in the previous 
section: rather than taking the corporation as a citizen in its own right, it takes the 
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corporation to be a proxy for the citizens who “compose” it.  Sometimes–more often in 
the political sphere than in corporate law–the metaphor of corporation as coalition is 
extended even to the people who act for the corporation, its employees.  
The key to the metaphor’s political power is that it makes the firm disappear.  
“Really,” this metaphor claims, General Motors doesn’t exist; it is just an illusion or a 
fiction.  Much as if someone were to claim that the United States doesn’t exist because it 
is “really” just its citizens or that an individual human is “really” the food she eats, the 
chemicals that make him up, or the brain cells that mediate her decisions, the corporation 
as aggregate metaphor urges us to ignore the sociological entity, the collective existence, 
the institutional and bureaucratic decision-making processes, the economic power and 
corporate assets (which do not belong to any individual or collection of individuals under 
current law), the material forces controlled by the firm, and the legal rights associated 
with the entity.  Instead, we should pretend that General Motors is no more than the 
financial interests of its shares.  The firm dissolves into its component parts (or some of 
them).   
1.  Role morality: why corporations won’t act the way the citizens who own 
shares in them or manage them would
I have discussed elsewhere the fallacy of assuming that the rights of the human 
beings behind the firm’s shares are protected by granting the firm rights; there is no 
necessary connection.37  In the current context, this version of the deconstruction of the 
firmless firm may be seen as follows:
Two actors, investors and managers, bargain with each other in the shadow of 
corporate law.  But the shadow of corporate law, as opposed for example to ordinary 
contract or labor law, is extremely dim.  As discussed above, managers and investors 
bargaining together may choose virtually any relationship, and associated law, they like.  
Managers and investors, then, are in something like the state of nature: They are 
unconstrained by anything other than their own powers and sense of right and wrong.  
Any agreement they come to and any law they agree to accept will necessarily be free of 
governmental coercion.  
Not accidentally, this is a picture of a classic free market, and the actors 
presumably are free in the same sense that market actors in the classical model are free.  
They may use whatever resources they have in the way that seems best to them under the 
circumstances.  Given the extraordinary range of options the law presents to negotiating 
investors and managers, it is not an effective restraint.
Unlike the anthropomorphized corporation, this picture of corporate freedom 
cannot be simply dismissed.  Reified corporations are not citizens.  But investors and 
managers are (or may be) humans and citizens in their own rights and the results of their 
free bargaining are entitled to prima facie deference, at least under fair background 
conditions. 
37Fictional Shareholders, supra n. .
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However, there is no reason to think that firms will function the same way as 
their separated component parts would; the aggregation theory fails to reflect sociological 
reality.  As I have argued elsewhere,38 investors and managers do not act like citizens.  
Investors, of course, may not be humans at all, and even if they are, in our increasingly 
global financial markets, they may not be citizens.  
Even if we restrict our gaze to actual human Americans entitled to political 
consideration, the corporate system’s role contexts mean that Americans acting on behalf 
of corporations will not act like citizens when in their managerial or investor roles.  Thus, 
managers of both corporations and institutional investors are tightly constrained by their 
roles to act in ways that they would not were they thinking as citizens.  In particular, 
managers, whether of corporations or their investors, are professionals.  As such, they are 
expected to set aside their own goals, views and interests in order to pursue those of their 
client–the corporation itself.  Ordinarily they should feel compelled to set aside all values 
that compete with profit maximization, even in circumstances where, as citizens, they 
would not do so.  For a manager who (as a citizen) believes that shareholder value 
maximization should sometimes give way to other duties–for example, environmental 
respect, working conditions suitable for parents, or commitments to or relationships with 
particular localities, employees or products–increased corporate freedom may 
paradoxically reduce managerial and investor freedom.  
Similarly, shareholders, whether because of institutional constraints or limited 
rationality, are likely to act as if they (or the humans they represent) had no interests 
other than maximizing the value of these particular shares at any cost.  That is the 
perspective of a colonialist exploiter, not a citizen.  
Consider, for example, tobacco companies.  Cigarettes are legal but many people 
believe they are dangerous and addictive.  Managers of an institutional investor, however, 
should feel obligated as professionals to set aside their personal views on this issue–the 
ones they would express as citizens in a political forum.  Instead, a good professional 
money manager will focus on whether tobacco companies are good investments. 
If other investors avoid tobacco stocks because of their political beliefs, the effect 
will be to drive down the price of tobacco stocks and, accordingly, increase the expected 
return.  A conscientious institutional investor, then, seeking to maximize return for his or 
her clients, will therefore see this as a strikingly good investment opportunity–even 
leaving aside the underlying business, which, since it involves the sale of addictive drugs, 
is likely to be quite profitable.  (Of course, any investment manager who cannot accept 
this internal separation between professional and citizen, and follows his views as a 
citizen or opts out of the profession entirely, simply increases the rewards for those who 
respond to the demands of role morality).  In a reasonably competitive market, these 
professional investors should overweight tobacco stocks until they drive the price back to 
38Essential Speech, supra n. .
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the point where it is in line with other market opportunities to purchase similar expected 
future returns.39
The net result should be that only those shareholders who concentrate strictly on 
profit will have any influence on the firm.   Profit maximizers set the price of the stock, 
since profit-seeking professionals see an arbitrage opportunity anytime price departs from 
expected return.  That means, of course, that any boycott by politically conscientious 
investors has no effect on stock prices or the stock market’s message to managers (except  
to reduce the boycotters’ expected returns40 and create some disequilibrium profits for 
first-mover arbitragers).41  Second, at any given time, the actual shareholding body 
should be composed of those who are comfortable with the role obligation to ignore 
issues other than profits: The others rationally will sell their stock. 
 Similarly, managers at the tobacco producing firm itself are likely to view the 
firm as having an obligation to its shareholders to continue in cigarette production so long 
as it is legal–regardless of any personal views they may hold.  As good professionals, it is 
their job to set aside their own views as citizens and instead work for the interests for 
which they are fiduciaries–that is, to profit maximize on behalf of shares.  Again, those 
who disagree are most likely to quit, leaving the field to those with fewer scruples but not 
affecting the institutional behavior at all.  
In short, the human shareholders and managers will either put aside their 
personal views and work for profit maximization, adjust their views to fit their job or find 
another line of work with less personal conflict.  Personal character and political, moral, 
ethical and aesthetic beliefs largely drop out.42  The conflict between role and citizen 
moralities is utterly impotent.  Profit, not citizens, controls the decision.  
Curiously, even if all the humans involved believed that cigarette manufacture is 
immoral, so long as enough of them were willing to set aside their personal beliefs and 
39The degree to which stock market pricing actually matches this model of rational pricing is highly controversial.  
However, if explicit, public, political attempts to move individual stock prices away from the relative valuation in the 
market of similar  risk adjusted expected future returns cannot be corrected by normal stock market processes, then stock 
prices are far less accurate than anyone has suggested..  Even efficient market pricing hypothesis sceptics should agree that 
given the general level of noise in stock market pricing, arbitrage should ensure that disapproving citizens “voting with 
their investing pocketbooks” will rarely have a perceptible impact on any company’s stock price. 
40Boycotters will be investing at something less than the efficient frontier, accepting lower returns than is necessary given 
their preferred level of risk. 
41Stock boycotts may well be politically effective via secondary effects on the firm.  First, the firm may be concerned that 
the bad publicity will have an actual adverse effect on the market for its products (rather than for its stock).  Consumers, 
unlike institutional investors, buy for many reasons other than to achieve the highest possible risk-adjusted stream of future 
earnings.  Many companies invest heavily in creating a “feel-good” appeal connected to their brandname, and negative 
publicity of any variety threatens that real market value.  Second, company managers may have self-image invested in 
considering themselves and the company they work for as good citizens advancing the quality of human life.  If boycotters 
threaten that image, managers may seek to rebuild it in a variety of ways, which could include changing the corporate 
behavior that boycotters find offensive, particularly if the company’s consumer markets are sufficiently far from full 
competitiveness to give managers some room to depart from profit maximizing norms.  
42That roles can dominate personal beliefs has been a commonplace of the social sciences at least since Durkheim.  In the 
law reviews, the notion has recently been masterfully restated by Hanson & Yosifon.  See generally, Jon Hanson & David 
Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to Deep Capture, 152 U. PENN. L. REV. 129 (2003).
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act as professionals, the corporation would continue to produce cigarettes to the 
maximum extent profitable under existing market and regulatory law circumstances.  The 
views of citizens, as citizens participating in the firm under the current corporate law 
regime, have no effect at all on how the firm is run.     
This picture can be generalized to all controversial activities that a firm may 
engage in.  Thus, for example, if discrimination is legal, managers of institutional 
investors may feel compelled to invest in discriminatory firms, especially if 
discrimination is profitable (as it may be where, for example, some customers prefer to 
deal with discriminatory firms43 or where discrimination is a cheap (to the firm) even if 
highly inaccurate and unfair alternative to fairer sorting mechanisms).  The more that 
other investors–acting as citizens–avoid discriminatory firms, the higher the profit 
potential of investing in discriminatory ones and the greater the pressure professional 
investors will feel to set aside their personal views and do what is best for their 
investment returns.  If pollution, or downsizing, or union-busting (or union-supporting in 
order to regularize employee relations and end wildcat actions), or creating unattractive, 
unnecessary, unsafe, addictive or immoral products, or gambling (with safety or literally), 
or weakening traditional families by odd working hours or frequent changes of the 
workforce, or purchasing the products of slave labor, or any other potentially 
controversial activity, is both legal and profitable, firms will do it regardless of the 
personal and political views of the investor and managerial classes.  
Conversely, firms will not engage in arguably socially attractive activities, 
regardless of the political views of those who run them, unless they are also perceived as 
profitable.  Businesses that close on holy days, offer pay or working conditions better 
than the market demands, avoid free-riding or externalization of costs, and so on, will be 
punished by the market; professional managers will avoid taking such actions when they 
cannot be justified as profit maximizing.  
Often, of course, such actions are (or can be imagined to be) profit-maximizing.  
Sometimes markets do reward seemingly other-directed actions. Employees and 
customers are people after all and most people respect and reciprocate a certain degree of 
fair dealing, patriotism, charity, decency and neighborliness. Charity that the firm (rightly 
or wrongly) believes is really advertising or above clearance wages that generate loyalty 
that the firm believes it needs, are profit maximizing and do not create the problem 
described above.  Even where exploitative behavior clearly would be more profitable, 
markets are imprecise and may not punish firms that do not profit maximize strictly.  
Managers, being human, may convince themselves that doing right is the best way to do 
good even when it is not true, despite the best efforts of the free-market theologians 
43Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964) (“I have nothing against blacks, but I’ll lose all my customers if I serve them”).  
Cf. Color Code: Black Entrepreneurs Face a Perplexing Issue: How to Pitch to Whites, WALL ST. J., 1/26/99 at 1 
(describing how black entrepreneurs avoid using black employees in visible positions because of fear of racist customers). 
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(including cases such as Dodge v. Ford) to teach them that doing right is actually 
wrong.44
Nonetheless, the net effect is that corporate freedom does not increase personal 
freedom for managers or investors.  They are constrained by the market to profit 
maximize.  What is profitable and legal will be done, regardless of how many citizens, 
even citizens acting as managers or investors, might prefer that the another value prevail 
and that controversy be decided against profit maximization.  A fortiori, the firm is not 
increasing the freedom of other participants who are neither proximate decision-makers 
nor beneficiaries of fiduciary duties. 
Moreover, political interventions to affect regulatory law are no different from 
any other decision the corporation must make.  Corporations run by professionals who 
remain within role obligations will typically lobby for regulatory law that enables them to 
profit maximize.   Self interest (except in  race-to-the-bottom end games) typically will 
drive them in the same direction.  The occasional citizen who sees a conflict with role 
obligation and chooses to stick with her sense of the right thing for a citizen to do, is 
likely to be eliminated from the system quickly, out-competed by those with fewer 
qualms about doing their (narrowly constructed) job.  Publicly traded firms thus become 
a permanent lobbying force for changing law to promote their own profit, regardless of 
the cost to competing values.
Finally, when it comes to choosing corporate law, this picture applies again.  The 
race, whether to the top or the bottom, involves only the value of profit versus the private, 
personal, non-professional interests of managers.  Corporate managers will choose 
corporate law that enables them to strike the best deal with shareholders or other 
powerful corporate constituents, typically the one that allows them to work for 
shareholders with the least distraction from societal values beyond profit or competing 
interests (except of course their own, whether best served by self-restraint and faithful 
service or by exploitation of other corporate participants).  
The most important difference between corporate law and regulatory law is that 
managers need not lobby for corporate law.  Under the current legal regime, they have 
the right and obligation to elect the law that best enables them to shift corporate surplus 
to shareholders, taking a portion along the way, without regard to any other values, even 
if as citizens they might act otherwise.  The powerful forces of the market, professional 
norms and law alike are arrayed against considering any alternative views.  
2.  Consumer sovereignty: the corporation as market, or are professional 
managers enabling someone else’s freedom?
It is sometimes argued that this professional constraint on managers and investors 
is precisely the reason why corporate freedom is human freedom.  Corporate investors 
44Dodge v. Ford Motor Co, 204 Mich. 459 (1919) (holding that firm may not be run as a semi-eleemosynary institution but 
must ignore will of its majority shareholder, public interest and interest of its employees even in face of arguable evidence 
that lowering prices and increasing wages would be profit maximizing).
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and managers have no ability to control what the market-place creates: if one individual 
or institution declines to act as the market demands, another firm will enter the deserted 
niche, with no effect on the market as a whole.  Thus, despite their apparent control, 
neither investors nor managers actually have any power at all.45 In this view the 
corporation itself is just a market, reflecting and aggregating the views of market 
participants without adding anything of its own.  Like the metaphor of the firmless 
aggregated firm described in the last section, this image also disaggregates the 
corporation.  This metaphor, however, does not present the corporation as “really” its 
shareholders or an independent citizen in its own right.  Instead, it claims it is “really” a 
powerless slave to consumers.   
Applied to corporate law, the argument is that, as the race-to-the-top argument 
contends, when investors and managers bargain and agree upon the legal form that is 
most advantageous to them, the markets for finance capital will assure that managers 
work for shareholders and that shareholders–by their ever-restless search for investments 
at or above the capital investment frontier–will place their capital where it is most 
productive and thus work for all of us.   In turn, the product market, by determining the 
ultimate profitability of the capital investment, assures that all of us, in our role as 
consumers, remain in ultimate control (at least to the extent that we are consumers).  
In this anti-political critique, politics are unnecessary because consumers are 
sovereign, the only independent actors in the economic system.  Accordingly, the only 
meaningful problems for corporate politics are the market failures–monopoly, free riding 
and information problems–and egalitarianism.
a.  Market failures
As to market failure, opinions vary, with some seeing market failure as unusual 
anomalies probably best ignored and others seeing the market model itself as no more 
than an heuristic to more easily identify the various pervasive failures.  For current 
purposes, it is perhaps enough to say that in the post-Lochner era, our democracy has 
agreed that markets must be structured and regulated by a political process under the 
ultimate control of elected officials and the electorates to which they are answerable.  
Markets generate determinate answers only within a determinate legal and regulatory 
system; to allow the market to choose its own regulatory system, as the race-to-the-
bottom/top does, is circular and unlikely to solve whatever market failures exist.  Rather, 
to whatever extent there are market problems, the race should simply accentuate them. 
b.  The egalitarian problem
The egalitarian problem is not a market failure but rather intrinsic to the market 
theory: the more perfect the market, the greater the egalitarian problem.  Although it is 
45In this strong form, the argument counterfactually assumes something like perfect competition.   More realistically, 
managerial power is limited to the interstices created by market imperfections such as transaction costs and failures of 
imagination.  
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sometimes understood in purely economic terms, the egalitarian problem is 
fundamentally a political one: Markets treat dollars, not citizens, as equal.  
i. Market equality vs. democratic equality
In a functioning capitalist marketplace, dollars are equal; in sharp contrast to 
feudal systems (or Soviet communism46), the identity and status of buyers and sellers is 
irrelevant.  “My dollars are as good as yours” is, I believe, the leading force behind most 
economic anti-discrimination law.  The market’s version of the anti-discrimination idea is 
that the highest bidder ought to win in the market; personal likes and dislikes should not 
affect the transaction.  Markets, thus, normally look to the product for sale, not personal 
characteristics of the buyer or seller: the bazaar is the great locus of freedom for despised 
castes.  Similarly, markets normally ignore history: the grocer has no obligation (or even 
right) to ask how I earned the cash I use to buy his products.  In a market context, there is 
always something presumptively wrong when auctions do not go to the highest bidder.   
Accordingly, markets ideally function anonymously, like the Stock Exchange or 
any well-organized commodity market, with only dollars representing the individuals 
behind them.  This anonymity ensures equality of dollars without regard to irrelevant 
personal factors, including (but not limited to) feudal status or caste, race, religion, party, 
and even personal dislikes.  In this market world, the “race-blind” version of anti-
discrimination law is quite natural: it is nothing more than the usual norm of anonymity.
Property notions contrast strongly to these market ideals.  On a property view, 
there is nothing odd about a property owner declining to go to the market or even 
entering into a non-market transaction with a favored person.  The anonymity of the 
Stock Exchange or other markets is not an exception to the property principle of personal 
control but rather a contrasting and opposed ideal.  Both privacy and property ideals 
suggest that the “owner” should have extensive control rights, including the right to 
decide to whom to transfer property, with whom to do business, and whom to permit to 
use the property.  
Property, thus, is based in personal relationships; in personal relationships, 
personality matters, so that discrimination is the norm, not an anomaly.  Where 
unbounded, irrational discretion is the norm, anti-discrimination principles are difficult 
and controversial.  If one may invite or not invite a person to enter into a relationship for 
any reason or no reason at all (as the employment-at-will doctrine provides), why is one 
particular reason forbidden, and how can a legal system distinguish between permissible 
and impermissible reasons, especially when they overlap, as must usually be the case?   
46In the heyday of the Soviet system, party elites had access to special stores and even special lanes on busy highways 
startlingly reminiscent of the ancien regime.  Compare, VICTOR HUGO, LES MISERABLES; DICKENS, TALE OF TWO CITIES 
(describing differential rights of aristocracy).  In twenty-first century America, we again have special transit systems 
(private jets, if not yet private highway lanes) for the super-rich and are rapidly returning to the principle that “only the 
little people pay taxes” (as Leona Helmsley presciently but prematurely put it), but we retain the equality of dollars.  
Anyone with $40 million can join the privileged classes.  
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Property and privacy are, in this sense, feudal ideals, enforcing actors’ abilities to 
enforce class and caste differences by treating different people differently; the market 
demand for equality of dollars conflicts with and erodes them.  Property rights find their 
highest development in the law of entail, allowing the owner to control the property even 
from beyond the grave.  Markets demand, in contrast, free alienability in order to elevate 
the equality of cash over the privileges of birth.47
Democracy shares with markets the rejection of the aristocratic ideal of personal 
relationships and caste privilege, and similarly rejects unlimited property rights to bar 
transactions.  In contrast to markets, however, political democracies hold members, not 
dollars, to be equal.  The property rights/aristocratic view allows owners to freely treat 
different people differently.  Markets insist that those with equal funds be treated equally, 
so that assets end up in the hands of those willing to pay the most, rather than staying 
within aristocratic castes.  Democracy demands that as equal members we, not our 
money, should have equal votes (and that other privileges of membership similarly be 
distributed based on equal membership).48
Because politically based understandings of equality extend to people and not 
just to dollars, they cannot fully accept the market understanding of the anti-
discrimination principle as simply anonymity.  To be sure, anonymity is an improvement 
over active discrimination.  For European Jews and American Blacks the right to buy real 
estate (referred to as “emancipation” in both contexts) on the same terms as others was a 
tremendous step forward from the old regime.  In feudal or caste-based societies, even 
willing and able sellers and willing buyers will be barred from transactions.  But just 
opening the ghetto gates or dismantling Jim Crow is not enough.  
Politics is never anonymous or without history; if the goal is to treat each other as 
equals in a common enterprise, we cannot be blind to the past.  To acknowledge our 
fellow citizens as members of a common enterprise, we must know who they are.  
Anonymity is a useful device for breaking down status distinctions. However, because 
the central figure of the democracy is the citizen, individuality can never be irrelevant 
and anonymity never fully possible. 
History is unimportant in a market in which equality is of dollars: Dollars have 
no memory.  But in the political arena, when we seek to treat our fellow citizens as fellow 
members of “us,” we can never ignore the past.  Even children know that a successful 
cooperative relationship requires taking turns: those who’ve gotten what they want in the 
past must allow the others to get what they want this time.  Democracies, then, should 
never fully accept the market-based “race blindness” principle that the goods go to the 
47But see, RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS 3 (1992) (arguing that anti-discrimination laws are both 
unnecessary and improper in a capitalist market).   Although Epstein claims to be a theorist of the market, his attack on the 
anti-discrimination laws is based on the property metaphor: He sees as fundamental to “freedom of contract” not the 
anonymity of the capitalist market but the unfettered discretion of the feudal property owner to refuse to deal.  In the name 
of capitalism, he is defending feudalism.
48For further discussion of these points, see Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty, supra n. .
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highest bidder regardless of how the bidder came to have its money or power.  Thus, 
more sophisticated anti-discrimination ideals go beyond the market’s anonymity to a 
political conception of membership in a common enterprise. 
ii. Egalitarianism: the equality of membership
Since Aristotle, equality has been seen as both fundamental and problematic.  
Aristotle proclaimed that justice is treating equals equally.49  This Aristotelian Principle 
seems fundamental to any notion of justice or fairness, but as Aristotle recognized, it is 
almost purely formal:  "equals and unequals, yes; but equals and unequals in what?"50
The Aristotelian Principle seems to require that some justification be offered for treating 
different people differently (or for treating different people the same.)  But it offers no 
theory of what constitutes equal situations or which differences may be cited to justify 
unequal treatment.  The great puzzle has been in determining which samenesses (or 
differences) of people are relevant.  Some theorists have claimed that equal humanity is 
enough.  Isaiah Berlin thus claims that pursuant to Aristotle, no special justification is 
needed for pure equal division of, for example, a cake.51  But he is wrong–different 
individuals are likely to be quite differently situated with respect to, for example, how 
much they contributed to making the cake, how much they want or need the cake, 
whether they are overweight or diabetic, and whether the cake distributor is in love with 
them.  Procrustean equality requires just as much justification as any other division, 
because ordinarily we are different.52  If justice requires treating equals equally, it also 
requires treating unequals inequally. 
In contrast, when membership in a democratic political community is the good 
being distributed, equality indeed is the only distribution that requires no justification.  
Equal members are equal in their membership and entitled to equal benefits of 
membership (whatever those may be).  Anything else means that some members are 
“more equal than others” or that some are only second-class members.53  (Of course, 
plenty of room is left to debate what the privileges of membership might be.54) 
To be a member of the group is to have the group consider you part of the “we” 
for whom the group acts.  If different members disagree on what the group goal should 
be, only some form of equality of decision making can fully acknowledge that all the 
members are indeed members, subjects rather than objects of the group.  Thus, most 
arguments regarding the proper scope of egalitarianism can be understood as disputes 
over whether a particular good is an attribute of membership.  If it is, like voting, it ought 
to be distributed equally, not based on need, contribution, love, desert, qualifications, 
49 POLITICS, Book III, Ch. XII, § 1.  (“persons who are equal should have assigned to them equal things.").
50Id. at III. xii. 2.  
51Isaiah Berlin, Equality, 56 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY 301 (1956).
52Compare, BABYLONIAN TALMUD, SANHEDRIN 109b (listing among the injustices of Sodom a Procrustian bed into which 
they forced all strangers to fit, stretching the short and chopping the long).  This kind of equality is the opposite of justice.  
53GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM.(1945).
54See, The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) (defining privileges and immunities of United States’ 
citizenship very narrowly).  
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ability to use it, status, wealth or some other basis.55  If it isn’t, other considerations likely 
apply.56
While democracies reject status distinctions as vehemently as do markets, the 
democratic principle, when it applies, will also reject wealth distinctions: members, not 
their bank accounts, are citizens of a democracy.   Because consumer sovereignty counts 
dollars rather than citizens as voters, democratic political justice will always seek to 
restrain it.  Consumer sovereignty gives the rich more votes than the poor.  Thus, it is 
based on an understanding of equality–the market’s equality of dollars–that is foreign to 
politics.  For this reason as well as the familiar problems of market failure, consumer 
sovereignty cannot be a solution to the aggregation problem.  It cannot transform the 
powerlessness of corporate managers and shareholders into political freedom because it 
ties them to the market, not the democratic regime.
c.  Limits to consumer sovereignty in a profit-driven world
But for present purposes, there is a more fundamental problem with the anti-
political claims of consumer sovereignty.  Consumer sovereignty, even setting aside the 
internal problems of market failure and the external problem of egalitarianism, can claim 
to control only a limited sphere of corporate behavior.  Consumers collectively direct the 
profit motive but cannot restrain it.  Even consumers who would prefer that firms limit 
their pursuit of profit in order to promote some other value have little choice but to buy 
the products of a profit maximizing firm.  
Indeed, given the realities of consumption in a world of information overload and 
limited time to allocate to shopping, consumers are likely to continue to patronize profit 
maximizing firms even in the unlikely circumstance that other choices do exist.  
Regardless of the strengths of ones political opinions or views about when the profit 
motive should defer to other important values, one is likely to compartmentalize: politics 
is for debating around the dinner table, not for shopping in the supermarket.  Of course, 
there are occasional exceptions: boycotts of grapes in support of the UFW, or of Proctor 
& Gamble for its supposedly satanic trademark.  But the limited number of such actions 
make them just arbitrary bolts of lightening with little impact on politics of the economy 
as a whole.  Most of the time, even consumers who strongly believe that corporate norms 
have drifted far from their values will buy products based on quality and price rather than 
the characteristics of the producer–if indeed they even know anything about the 
characteristics of the producer.  In the anonymous market, it is the product that is 
important, not the process by which it was produced or the other actions of the producer.
Thus, for example, the New Yorker reports that all the major orange juice 
producers purchase oranges from a market that employs slave labor.57  Similar allegations 
55See, e.g., the default voting rule of the Uniform Partnership Act § 18 (e) (providing that “all partners have equal rights in 
the management and conduct of the partnership business”).
56Partnerships not always being membership groups in the political sense, default rules are only default rules.  Compare, 
MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE (discussing spheres in which (different senses of) equality is appropriate, 
principally attributes of membership); Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty, supra n. .
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have been made about sneakers.58 The principle of market anonymity–consumers buy 
products, not producers–allows otherwise decent people at Tropicana and Nike largely to 
ignore the conditions of workers who, after all, are not their employees and for whom 
they are not responsible.  Most American consumers, I assume, would prefer to pay 
slightly more for orange juice or sneakers rather than support slavery.  Consumer 
sovereignty, however, does not offer this option.  One can buy high quality orange juice 
or low quality orange juice, but there is no way to buy slavery-free orange juice.
Similarly, the market anonymity notion that only product, not process, is 
important was the underpinning to Alan Greenspan’s opposition to President Clinton’s 
proposal that Social Security invest in the stock market.59   Under the Clinton proposal in 
its original form, Social Security would have held up to 4% of the publicly traded stock.60
Greenspan expressed concern that the government might seek to use these holdings 
politically, for example, in opposition to cigarette smoking.  At first glance, Greenspan’s 
criticism is almost incomprehensible.  If tobacco production is bad for America, why 
wouldn’t we want the government to use whatever tools are available to limit it, and why 
would we want Social Security to provide the tobacco industry with investment capital?  
Within the logic of the anonymous market, however, Greenspan’s concern is 
straightforward.  The capital market produces returns on capital, and purchases in that 
market “should” reflect only returns on capital, not “extraneous” issues like where those 
returns came from.  Greenspan is, in effect, making an anti-discrimination argument: 
Investors should not discriminate against producers whose products or production 
methods are perceived to be immoral.  It is, therefore, a powerful political claim that in 
the marketplace profit maximization ought always to trump other competing values.  In 
accord with this view, Greenspan’s preferred proposal, individual accounts, does not 
privatize the values decision but rather assures that profit-maximization will be the only 
value expressed.  There is no practical way for individual investors investing small 
amounts of money via mutual funds to express any other value.61
There is no effective way for consumers to signal when they believe the profit 
motive has gone far enough.  As a result, corporate “freedom” in the consumer 
sovereignty model is simply the freedom to profit maximize, regardless of what 
competing values may be about.   Real citizens always have other values than profit 
maximization and real politics usually is about the trade-offs and conflicts between them.  
The consumer market, however, denies voice to this debate and coerces one solution to 
all value conflicts: profit uber alles.  Not only investors and managers, then, but 
consumers as well, may find that granting rights or freedom of action to corporations
does not increase their freedom as citizens at all. 
57John Bowe, Nobodies: Slave Labor in South Florida, NEW YORKER (April 21, 2003) at 106, 128.  
58See, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (recounting allegations and Nike’s denials).
59NY TIMES January 23, 1999.  
60WALL ST J. Jan 25, 1999.
61See, Fictional Shareholders, supra n. .
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We see, then, that the corporation can not be reduced to its components–whether 
shareholders or customers.  It will predictably act differently from and often in opposition 
to the human beings who make it up, as managers–even if they act entirely in good faith 
and even leaving aside the obvious problems of corruption and self-interest–find that 
their role constrains them to ignore the interests, values and desires of the human beings 
they are meant to serve.  Corporate freedom can not be justified as simply freedom for 
the corporation’s human members (however defined) any more than freeing the state 
would necessarily increase the freedom of its citizens.
C.  Corporations as Property
A third justification of treating corporate freedom as human freedom stems from 
a misuse of fundamental liberal notions of property.  Protecting property is an important 
part of protecting freedom.  Corporations are sometimes viewed as a form of property.  
Ergo, it seems axiomatic that protecting corporations must be protecting freedom.  
To fully engage the argument about property and freedom would require a 
discussion of property that is beyond the scope of this Article: the relationship between 
property rights and freedom is a good deal more complex than the simple assertion 
acknowledges.  For a start, property rights are the right to demand that the state protect 
certain power relationships between people and objects or among contesting human 
claims to objects.  The objects of the claims, of course, need not be something physical: 
one can have property in purely legal inventions, such as cash flows, stock or copyrights.  
Since all property involves contested power relationships, invoking property rights can 
only begin, never finish, a discussion about freedom.  Property rights are the ability to say 
that some things are mine for some purpose, but the more that is mine, the less that is 
yours, and so my property (and my freedom, in this sense) necessarily conflicts with 
yours.  A persuasive theory of property (and a persuasive theory of liberal freedom) must 
explain where my property (and freedom) ends and yours begins, not simply assert that 
property (or freedom) is a good thing.   
With respect to corporations, the simple equation of property and freedom suffers 
from an even simpler flaw.  In our legal system, no human holds the basic fee simple
property rights in a public corporation.  It is fundamental to Delaware corporate law that 
public shareholders own their shares but not the corporation: they have no right to control 
the corporation.  At the most basic level, so long as the corporation remains public, no 
participant in it has the right to destroy it.  More importantly, as we saw in the previous 
section, no one has the right to change its basic purpose or adopt a different set of values 
for it than the one–profit maximization–that the market as currently regulated mandates.  
For example, were a majority of the shareholders (or even the holders of a 
majority of its shares) of a public corporation to believe that the public good would be 
better served if the corporation were to sacrifice some profits for a public purpose–
supporting a war effort, protecting the environment, educating the younger generation, 
building bigger highways, offering above-market employment terms to farmers, 
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descendants of former presidents or other meritorious citizens–they would have no 
mechanism in current corporate law to cause the corporation to take on this task.  First, 
shareholders have no right to manage the corporation.  As a rule, shareholder resolutions 
on issues of corporate management must be merely precatory and do not bind directors.  
Indeed,  the fact that a majority of the shares voted had been cast in favor of the project 
would be largely irrelevant.   Directors are bound by fiduciary duty to act as Burkean 
statesmen, doing what they in their best professional business judgment view as in the 
interests of the corporation, not to be mere representatives of share-voter will. 
Second, were shareholders to use their right to elect a board of directors of 
similar views, the directors would have a fiduciary duty to represent all shareholders and 
not just those who voted for them, and to take into account the interests–not the views–of 
all shareholders (understood as undiversified investors with no interests other than the 
share value).  Were the directors to conclude that they should pursue the platform on 
which they were elected, they would be subject to personal liability on a breach of duty 
lawsuit for corporate waste, brought by even a single holder of a single share: and, if the 
directors were open about their decision to sacrifice share profit for another goal, they 
would stand a good chance of losing.62 The directors have a fiduciary duty to act in the 
interests of the shares that is independent of the shareholders’ own views as to those 
interests.63
Corporations are not representative democracies.  Indeed, when a corporation’s 
board seeks to take some action that is not within the norms of ordinary share value 
maximization, courts generally view the existence of a voting majority supporting the 
directors as an aggravating, not a mitigating, factor.  The majority vote demonstrates not 
electoral legitimacy but majority oppression. 
Third, the market will punish such deviance from share value maximization even 
more harshly than the fiduciary law.  Most investors in the public market in fact behave 
as if they wish to maximize the value of their shares regardless of other values they may 
hold.  Some may not have any conflicting values or may resolve the conflict in favor of 
share profit.  Others will act as if they had no conflicting values even though they do, due 
62Ordinarily, directors pursuing goals other than immediate share value justify their actions by invoking long term share 
value.  Courts are generally quite deferential to such claims, upholding the directors’ actions under the Business Judgment 
Rule unless there is evidence of self-dealing or the court concludes that the directors’ justification is incredible.  See, e.g., 
A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 13 N.J. 145 (1953) (upholding charitable contribution based on implausible testimony that 
gift was profit-maximizing). 
63Thus, in the few cases where directors have openly stated that they were not running the corporation in the interests of 
fictional shareholders, courts have been far less deferential to managerial judgments.  See e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co, 
204 Mich. 459 (1919) (holding improper corporation’s decision to act according to political views of the holder of a 
majority of its shares, despite evidence that course was in fact profit maximizing); Smith v. Van Gorkum, 488 A.2d 858 
(Del. 1985) (holding that directors may not abdicate their fiduciary duties in favor of a shareholder vote); Revlon, Inc. v. 
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del 1985) (barring directors from considering actual interests of 
owners of shares–who were also owners of bonds–and requiring that they instead pretend that share owners have no 
interests other than share value maximization).  
© Daniel J.H. Greenwood
Preliminary Draft - Not For Publication 3/05
36
to the simplifications of ordinary cognitive overload, which are likely to leave them 
citizens in the voting booth but share-value-maximizers in the stock market. 
Moreover, roughly half of the publicly traded shares are held by institutions that 
are legally required to pursue share value maximization regardless of the views of the 
humans who manage them or are their ultimate beneficiaries.  Standard financial theory 
suggests that these professional investors, committed only to share-value maximization, 
ordinarily will set the market price.64
Each of these investors will sell or avoid the shares of any company that openly 
deviates from a share value maximization strategy, driving the company’s share price 
down to reflect its reduced financial prospects for profit-maximizing shareholders.  That 
reduced share price, in turn, opens an enormous profit opportunity: an arbitrageur who 
can acquire control at a price reflecting the corporation’s public good orientation can 
make a huge and easy profit by directing the firm to revert to the market’s normative 
amoralism.  The powerful incentives of the capitalist marketplace should assure that 
intentional, explicit deviations from the profit maximization norm will be rare indeed.
 In the ordinary course, this market incentive should be enough to force a 
corporation interested in pursuing any goal other than share value maximization into a 
limited set of options. It can, of course, go private: A single shareholder has a set of rights 
much closer to fee simple absolute than do public shareholders, even in the aggregate.  
With only one shareholder, legal doctrines of fiduciary duty are irrelevant and market 
pressures are mere opportunity costs (the firm would be worth more in another, more 
conventional, shareholder’s hands, but so long as the private owner is willing to sacrifice 
the money that could be made by selling out, the market has no power to force change).  
Short of ceasing to be a public corporation, however, the corporation that seeks 
to place a goal above shareholder profit has only two plausible courses. It can seek to 
persuade (or fool) the investing public that there is no conflict between its goals, that it 
can do well by doing good.  This was the tactic taken by the numerous corporations that 
vastly increased managerial pay in the last several decades.  They claimed they were 
doing this not because it was good for managers but because it was good for 
shareholders, and to a large extent they successfully persuaded the market that indeed 
there is no conflict between giving managers huge stock option grants and making 
shareholders (now including managers) rich.65  If persuasion fails and going private is not 
an option, it will have little choice but to abandon the other values under pressure of the 
stick of threatened takeover or the carrot of rich increases in share value for returning to 
the fictional shareholder’s service.  
The property metaphor, thus, fails to support corporate freedom because publicly 
held corporations are not property: No human has the legal right to use them for any 
64See supra, p. .  
65This is the typical tactic in litigation as well.  See, e.g., A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 13 N.J. 145 (1953) (charitable 
contribution defended as not really charity but rather advertising); Brehm v. Eisner, 825 A.2d 275, 286 (Del. 2003) 
(managerial payoff defended as shareholder-value maximizing).
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human purpose other than the one specified by race to the bottom/top law, namely share 
profit.  
In short, none of the metaphors of corporation as citizen, contract or property 
provides a sufficient justification for freeing corporations from the law.  Corporate 
freedom is not human freedom; we must instead consider when and where corporate law 
will promote our interests and desires and when it will not.
D.  Corporate Law and Value Choices: corporations as 
voluntary associations or local governments
The reason that corporations must be taken to be tools of citizens rather than the 
citizens themselves is central to corporate law’s legitimacy and success.  Real citizens 
have multiple and diverse views, reflected in and reflecting their various and conflicting 
value judgments about many issues important to public life.  In a democracy, value issues 
must be debated and decided in a political process: it is fundamental to the notion of 
equal citizenship that no democratic citizen has the right to determine value issues by fiat.
1.  Elections without democracy
Corporate managers are not elected by anything resembling a legitimate 
democratic political process.  Corporate law, and in particular corporate governance 
advocates, often use the rhetoric of political democracy to explain why shares should be 
given authority within the corporation’s internal decision-making processes.  But the 
rhetoric only works because we don’t take it seriously.  
Were corporations understood to be political organizations run by a democratic 
process, we would have to reform corporate law in a radical and fundamental fashion: 
Democracies operate on a principal of one person one vote and corporations do not.  The 
fundamental voting rule of corporate law is that only shareholders vote and they do so on 
the basis of one share one vote (subject to some flexibility when the corporation elects 
different voting rules and with the potential disenfranchisement or vote dilution of poison 
pills and their statutory equivalents).  Voting, thus, is proportional to wealth, not 
membership.  In a democracy, the principle of one-dollar-one-vote would be completely 
unacceptable.66
  Corporate “democracy,” then, fails the most basic test of democracy.  It does 
not provide for equal citizenship.  (Alternatively, one could say that it does provide for 
equal citizenship, but the citizens are dollar investments, not human beings).  Moreover, 
it does not provide citizenship for the right people.  While shareholders have limited say 
in running the corporation, proportional to their shareholdings, many other constituents 
66Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (invalidating New York law granting school district vote only 
to owners of taxable real property and parents of enrolled children on ground that it denies excluded citizens the equal 
protection of the laws); but see, Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981) (upholding “one acre-one vote” scheme for water 
reclamation district election on ground that, although governmental in form, the relationship was closer to that of business 
and customer).  
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and affected parties, some of them (unlike most shareholders) even human, lack even a 
limited right to vote.
Corporate law, however, has not gone the way of other pre-democratic regimes.  
In part, this is a failure of the democratic project, a remnant of the bad old days still alive 
in our midst, a reminder that not all democratic failure is abroad.  
2.  Excluding politics from corporate elections: policing professionals not 
choosing values
But in part the survival of corporate law’s limited and unequal voting is because 
the basic self-understanding of corporate law is not political at all.  Corporate law does 
not imagine directors to play the role of elected representatives of the “people” or even of 
the dollar investments of fictional shareholders, for the simple reason that corporate law 
does not imagine directors to be making the value choices that are the appropriate realm 
of elective politics.  
Instead, corporate law itself makes the value choice.  According to the law 
corporations have chosen for themselves, corporations are an organization created for and 
dedicated to a limited and specified purpose.  As a matter of corporate law, corporations 
exist to make money for shareholders proportional to their shareholdings.  Directors and 
their managerial delegates are understood to be professionals who, like other 
professionals, will work out the implications of this goal.  Like other professionals, they 
have a good deal of discretion in interpreting, giving meaning to and pursuing the goal.  
The business judgment rule is largely a recognition of the need for this large degree of 
professional autonomy.  But like other professionals, they violate their role if they 
substitute their own values for the goal that is set for them by their client.67  In this case, 
the client is corporate law itself, and the goal is profit maximization from a fictional 
shareholder perspective.   
On this view, the purpose of shareholder “democracy” is simply to police the 
professionals.  Shareholders do not vote to make value choices, to reaffirm common 
membership in a joint enterprise, or to give meaning to collective commitments.  Rather, 
they  vote in order to keep directors within their role requirements, to ensure that they 
aren’t stealing from the corporation or distorting it to some other purpose.  
Unlike citizens, shareholders do not vote to determine the fundamental value 
conflicts that are outside a professional’s role.  Public shareholders are not the client. 
Rather, the principal of these professional agents is merely a legal principle.68 Unlike a 
doctor’s client, they have no right to pull the plug.  Unlike a lawyer’s client, they have no 
right to instruct the professionals to take an action just because the client thinks it is right.  
Those client decisions are made by corporate law.  Rather, the shareholder role is to 
eliminate corruption, self-service and incompetence.  
67See Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty, supra n. , for a fuller discussion.
68See, Fictional Shareholders, supra n. .
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The limited shareholder role is the reason why shareholder votes so often look 
more like the plebiscites of dictatorial regimes than the tense contests of democratic ones.  
Where conflicts are over views of the world or balances between powerful but conflicting 
moral claims, voters normally will disagree, often sharply.  It would be quite surprising if 
a democratic vote produced a 95% majority on abortion rights, for example, or indeed on 
any issue of importance and interest.  In contrast, if the issue is corruption or even 
competence in pursuing an agreed-upon goal, one would expect a high degree of 
uniformity: these are largely factual issues more amenable to consensus.  
3.  The benefits of monomania
The public corporation’s single and limited goal is the source of much of the 
success of our corporate sphere.  Corporate managers, unlike political leaders, need not 
concern themselves with the views of their electorates.  On the contrary, in the ordinary 
course they don’t even need to know who the electorate is.  Instead, they can view 
themselves as working for a purely imaginary and purely homogeneous fictional 
shareholder.  As Henry Hansmann and Kelman explained in their different ways, this 
unanimity of purpose (even if it is only a legal imposition) drastically simplifies the 
directors’ task.   Basic value conflicts are excluded from their job.  It is someone else’s 
responsibility, not the board of directors’ or the managers’, to decide when profit should 
give way to other important values.  Of course, the problem is that the “someone else” 
often does not exist.  Corporate monomania is not balanced by any similarly strong 
countervailing power.
The issues that are left are by no means simple: managers and directors are 
charged with finding the cheapest and most efficient ways to turn raw materials, ideas 
and human labor into saleable products.  But those are professional issues, requiring 
expertise and rationality, not representativeness or value choices; they are issues of 
applying hypothetical not categorical imperatives.  Managers can specialize in that 
limited set of issues without worrying about the rest of the harder problems of our 
collective and political life.  Presumably, we all win, or at least have a more successful 
economy, because of this division of labor.  (This, no doubt, is also a key reason why 
private industry sometimes is able to provide services more cheaply than government.  
Government officials are almost never permitted to put aside the other considerations that 
public corporate managers are required to set aside).69
69Hansmann contends that the simplicity of goals of shareholders reduces their governance costs and that this efficiency is, 
in turn, the key reason why shareholders run corporations.  See, e.g., Henry Hansmann, The End of History for Corporate 
Law, 89 GEO. L. J. 439, 445-6 (2001) (contending that heterogenity of interests precludes efficient decision-making).  But 
the “uniformity of interests” of shareholders is entirely a result of legally structured markets that render invisible all the 
multifarious interests, values and goals of the human beings behind the shareholders, leaving only share-value 
maximization.  It is hard to see why efficiently promoting only one value at the expense of all others is an effective way of 
achieving the values ignored.  Kelman makes a somewhat similar point: because governmental institutions are usually 
expected to balance various competing goals (because the world is full of competing values), their processes are almost 
necessarily more “expensive” if measured along the single value of private cost minimization with no balancing.  
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But if the limited role of corporate decision-makers is the source of their success, 
it is also the reason why corporations are not legitimate participants in the political 
process of creating corporate law and deciding the limits of the corporate sphere.  A 
public corporation is a legally created entity designed to accomplish a specific purpose.  
The purpose is useful, even noble.  But it is only one purpose among many human 
purposes and it often conflicts with others.  A single purpose entity devoted to one value 
alone is in no position, almost by definition, to know when to stop, when that value must 
be balanced with others.  Because corporate values are the product of corporate law, not 
of the citizens that work for or invest in or purchase from the corporation, corporations 
must not be allowed to decide the limits of their own values.
4.  The proper limits of the corporate sphere
When corporations choose corporate law, the result is not freedom of citizens, but 
freedom from citizens.  An important aspect of our collective governance structure, 
created to promote one of our values, is out of our control and out of its proper sphere.  
Corporations cannot properly balance the claims of employees, bondholders, tort victims, 
pensioners or environmental claimants against those of shareholders: they have been 
designed to view the former as strangers to be exploited to the maximum extent practical 
for the benefit of the latter.  Corporations can not balance the claims of conservatism–
children who need continuity in school, communities that thrive on commitment and 
stability, employees whose skills are not readily redeployed–against those of growth and 
dynamism.  They have been designed to exclude the former claims from consideration 
except to the extent they serve the latter.
Corporate law sets the limits to corporate one-sidedness.  It is corporate law that 
tells corporate managers whom they must consider a cost and whose gain is the 
corporation’s gain, that increased dividends are good in themselves, but increased salaries 
are bad (unless they are a means to the proper end–increased dividends).  Having 
constructed contract and tort claimants as outsiders and costs, corporate law then sets the 
limits to which they may be exploited, by determining, for example, the degree to which 
corporate managers can move assets out of the reach of those claimants for the benefit of 
the shareholders for whom directors are meant to work. 
The race to the bottom/top or free corporate choice of law distorts the process of 
countervailing powers that ought to be at work here.  Professional managers working 
within a given framework to maximize a single value must have someone else–the client, 
the citizenry–to do the job they have given up, namely deciding when it is no longer 
appropriate to pursue that value.  In our corporate law system, no corporate player can do 
that balancing.  But the race to the bottom/top means that corporate players, not the 
citizenry or their elected representatives, are determining the law that determines where 
Governments are not supposed or permitted to act like profit-maximizing businesses that ignore all other values, and there 
is something odd about then condemning them for that.  It is, rather, their strength.  
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share value maximization will end.  That cannot be right.  If we allow the one-sided 
maximizer to set its own limits, there will be no limits set.
III.  Taking Corporate Law Public
Corporations are power centers in our society, not citizens that need to be 
protected from the powerful.  Once we de-anthropomorphize them, stepping away from 
the metaphor of a corporation as a person with an intrinsic value of its own, this seems 
almost painfully obvious.  Corporations are tools that we create for our own purposes, 
much like governments, and much like governments they can function to make our lives 
better–or the reverse.  “‘The question is,’ said Humpty Dumpty, ‘which is to be master–
that's all.’”70
The internal affairs doctrine and the race to the bottom/top make corporations 
subject only to their own ineluctable internal logic.  They choose their own law according 
to the role restraints and incentives of their own decision-makers, defined in large part by 
the very law they’ve chosen.  Shareholder votes and market constraints, to be sure, limit 
the freedom of action of corporate decision-makers to a significant degree.  But neither 
offers a mechanism for importing the full range of important political issues into 
corporate governance.  The mechanisms for shareholder influence have the effect of 
stripping away shareholder humanity, leaving only a legal fiction dedicated to its own 
self-interested profit maximization.  Such a “voter” is an extremely poor proxy for the 
genuine interests and wishes of real human beings (even leaving aside the fundamental 
problem that in politics, unlike investment, one dollar one vote is clearly illegitimate).  
Even setting aside these role problems of the constrained manager,  the fictional 
shareholder and the limited sovereignty of consumers, there is another problem with the 
standard picture.  Market choice analysis assumes that corporate law is basically private 
law.  Managers and investors, in a situation of relatively equal bargaining power, 
negotiate a mutually beneficial contract; outsiders have only a relatively minimal interest, 
primarily in preventing fraud and informational failings or possibly in protecting the 
weaker party from overreaching.71  This picture is manifestly false.
70LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS (ch. VI).
71
 The conditions under which apparently voluntary transactions should be viewed as in fact voluntary are controversial.  
Compare, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY STATE AND UTOPIA (1974) (listing conditions under which voluntary 
agreements should be seen as voluntary); Nozick Normative Theory of Individual Choice.   Nozick, who views agreements 
made at the point of a gun as voluntary, takes a rather extreme expansive view of voluntarism. For a contrasting view, see, 
e.g., GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (arguing that contract law is largely indistinguishable from tort, because 
legal and moral analysis is always necessary to determine whether an agreement should be enforced).  In Gilmore’s 
analysis, voluntariness is always a matter of degree, and coercion is almost always present to some extent.  Cf. Kennedy, 
Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal 
Bargaining Power, 41 Md. L. Rev. 563 (1982).  
[Delete this para. Contract law theorists debate whether contracts are binding because they are promises (and promises 
have intrinsic moral force), see e.g., CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE (1981),  or rather in order to encourage 
mutual reliance, see, e.g., Anthony Kronman, Contract as Promise, 91 YALE L.J. 404, 411 (1981).  Under the former view, 
the intrinsic moral force surely diminishes as the promise appears more coerced; under the latter view, the social interest in 
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Corporate law is public law: the private arrangements of investors and managers 
in the dim shadow of a nearly voluntary law affect all of us.  The law of business 
organizations determines the effectiveness of other regulatory schemes and sets the 
framework within which markets function.  Thus, as a simple example, it is the law of 
business organizations that determines who is responsible (and to what degree) for 
business violations of tort, regulatory or criminal norms.  If regulatory schemes seek to 
make firms internalize costs they would otherwise externalize, but business law allows 
them to decline the resulting liability, the regulatory scheme fails.  
Similarly, it is business law that determines on whose behalf managers work: the 
market tells firms to profit maximize, but to a large extent it is law that determines where 
the firm ends and the outside begins.  Law, by setting the boundaries of the firm, can help 
to decide who is an input to be exploited to the maximum degree the market permits and 
who is the firm, to receive profits to that same degree.  Law determines the relative power 
of the various parties to the market negotiation, for example by solving (or creating) 
collective action problems.   And business law affects the time frame chosen by 
managers, their responses to taxation, and a myriad of other issues.  
A.  The Effects of Free Bargaining for Corporate Law
In the remainder of this section, I summarize some of the areas in which business 
law affects the citizenry as a whole,  creating significant political issues that cannot be 
debated or decided within a market based framework of consumer sovereignty or free 
choice of law  for business entities. 
Market negotiations take place within a given allocation of powers and resources; 
our business organization law regime empowers certain parties at the expense of others.  
encouraging reliance diminishes as the promise becomes less voluntary.  Neither view, however, determines the issue of 
how to determine when an agreement should be seen as voluntary.  See, e.g., Kronman at 414 (Fried rejects consideration 
doctrine, maintaining that “what ought to matter... is the freedom with which a promise is made”); 417-20 (discussing line 
between permissible and impermissible advantage taking under his and Fried’s approaches).] 
Since bargaining tends to reproduce or accentuate existing power imbalances–the party that can walk, as every business 
advice book teaches, wins the deal–the law (and moral theory) tends to devalue agreements when the background 
conditions are too imbalanced.  Thus, if one party holds a gun, the agreement will be viewed as coercive.  If one party 
conceals (too much) relevant information, the agreement may be labeled fraudulent, mistaken, or unconscionable.  If one 
party seems to have too much  bargaining power, the law may disregard the agreement under the doctrines of overreaching 
or duress.   See, e.g. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (DC Cir. 1965) (holding overreaching 
contract unenforceable for unconscionability); Alaska Packers Association v. Domenico, 117 F. 99 (9th Cir. 1902) (holding 
that immigrant fishermen were not entitled to $50 for the season pursuant to contract with the Fish Trust renegotiated in 
mid-fishing season in Alaska after discovering they had been misled, because of lack of consideration–the Trust was 
“coerce[d]”into agreeing), discussed in Debora Threedy, Fish Story, 2000 UTAH L. REV 185 (stating that case has become 
a classic example of duress or extortion, despite fact that fishermen faced a monopoly employer with potentially excess 
supply and evidence that employer was exploiting its monopoly power.
Nonetheless, bargaining between upper level managers and investors appears to be quite close to the paradigmatic model of 
free contract.  Investors are both fully fungible and faced with a wide array of (according to modern portfolio theory if not 
always legal doctrine, see (injunctions)) largely fungible investment options.  Managers are not nearly so fungible nor do 
they face as competitive a market for their services, but at least in the upper levels they seem relatively mobile and quite 
amply compensated.  But see, John C. Coffee, Shareholders v. Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH L. 
REV.1 (1984) (describing shareholder defection from legally unenforceable commitments to middle level managers).  
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State corporations law, in its current incarnation, solves many of the negotiation problems 
fictional shareholders (and the shareholder/managerial alliance) might have, while 
leaving other participants in the firm with serious collective action problems.  This result 
is precisely what one might predict from the race to the bottom/top: neither the financial 
markets nor the proximate decision-makers have any interest in choosing law that would 
increase the effective market power of other (non-shareholder or manager) participants in 
the corporation.  
Corporate law overweights the responsiveness of firms to the needs of capital and 
underweights the response to other claimants.  In turn, this empowerment of capital has 
dramatic effects on our collective life and culture, effects that ought to be highly 
controversial.  Capital, after all, is immortal, uncommitted, fully fungible, and mobile, 
while citizens usually are none of those.  Corporate law makes corporations and the law 
they influence subservient to markets, and markets–for all their efficiency in producing 
consumer goods–left to their own also efficiently produce increased inequality of income 
and wealth,72 environmental destruction and other unpleasant side effects.    
The controversy, however, is suppressed by a legal system that allows voice only 
to one side.  So long as corporate law is chosen by corporate managers accountable only 
to corporate shareholders, other claimants and potential beneficiaries or victims will not 
be heard.  As a result, we make a critically important political decision about our 
collective life without either a democratic collective (political) decision or a meaningful 
aggregation of individual (economic) decisions: not the views of individual citizens but 
the legal structure of voluntary law determines the collective decision.  
The key aspects of the bargaining struggle that are determined by law are relative 
mobility, collective action and free-rider issues, governance problems relating to 
conflicting goals, and ease of externalization.
1.  Relative power: mobility, time indifference and unity of capital
Corporate law constructs shareholders as identical and fungible.  As a matter of 
corporate law, the shareholders of a given corporation are assumed to be primarily 
interested in that corporation maximizing its profits (calculated from a shareholder 
perspective) and, ultimately, its payout to shareholders.  Since the law requires that 
corporate payouts to shareholders be made pro rata, shareholders ordinarily are imagined 
to be identically situated with respect to this goal.  
This construct is a fiction.  In fact, all human shareholders (and all human 
beneficiaries of corporate shareholders) have other relationships with the firm in other 
72Employment and wealth markets will tend to make the richer faster than the poor, thus increasing inequality, whenever 
they are left relatively unrestrained.  This follows almost axiomatically from two foundational principles of free trade: the 
diminishing marginal utility of money and voluntary trade.  The latter means that market transactions don’t take place 
unless both sides view the transaction as profitable.  The former means that it takes more to make a transaction attractive to 
the rich than to the poor.  The combination simply reaffirms the popular understanding that in bargaining, he who can
walk, wins.  At the extremes, if you need to eat, you will give up whatever is necessary; if you already have more than you 
know what to do with, you must be paid exorbitant sums to induce further participation.  Thus, the wealthy will need to be 
paid quite a bit to convince them to work, invest, or even consume at levels commensurate with their wealth.    
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roles.  The law treats shareholders as if they were aliens or imperialist occupiers, with no 
interest in our society other than extracting maximum profit from it.  In fact, however, we 
are also consumers, employees, neighbors and citizens and must care about other issues 
as well.  Even those shareholders who really are aliens encounter firms in other roles: if 
nothing else, at least as inhabitants of a limited ecosphere.  
The fiction, however, assures that the interests of shareholders in share value 
maximization will be efficiently pursued even in circumstances where the actual humans, 
on reflection or in a system that allowed more room for expression of conflicting 
interests,  might prefer that other interests be pursued as well or instead.  Citizens who 
disapprove of liquor, cigarettes, daytime television, pollution or whatever will 
nonetheless find their pension savings efficiently used to promote the production of those 
“goods” so long as it remains profitable.73
Because the law makes shareholders identical, the financial markets can 
effectively and rapidly move capital to corporations that it believes are profit 
maximizing.  This mobility, in turn, ensures that fictional shareholders (in other words, 
the interest that real shareholders have, among other interests, in maximizing the value of 
their shares) will have an enormous bargaining advantage as against employees and other 
firm participants, who are almost necessarily less mobile.  If Wall Street doesn’t receive 
its due, it will simply take its capital elsewhere. 
As between fictional shares and managers, top managers have place and 
information advantages relative to shares that may be even more important than the fickle 
mobility of the financial markets.  That is the conflict between race to the bottom and 
race to the top theorists.  As between top managers and shares, the division of the spoil 
will depend on whether mobility and fungibility or place and information win out.  The 
results will shift from time to time, depending on the degree to which the financial market 
anticipates managerial defections ex ante, whether those managers who would prefer to 
bind themselves not to defect are able to overcome the resistence of those already playing 
an end game of “apres moi (and my millions) le deluge,” and whether the legal system 
generates solutions to what otherwise may become a market for lemons in which 
investors, unable to assure themselves that managers will not defect, simply opt out. 
However, other corporate participants generally can expect to find a united front 
of mobile shares and informed managers set against them.  In the market competition for 
division of the corporate pie, capital has a basic advantage: it can walk more easily than 
can labor.  Other corporate participants may be entirely locked in, with commensurately 
little bargaining power: for example, pensioners; employees with non-transferable 
seniority, firm specific skills or medical plans; the city in which a plant is located and 
other economic neighbors; suppliers and consumers of less than completely fungible 
73See supra p. ff.
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products; and so on.74 As against all these, the ease with which the financial markets can 
cripple the firm should allow shares to extract a large part of the corporate surplus.  
Moreover, these other corporate participants can expect no assistance or 
recognition from corporate law.  Whatever their differences between themselves, shares 
and managers alike gain by limiting the responsibilities of the corporation to its other 
participants.  The race to the bottom/top means that corporate law will be chosen by 
corporate managers answerable primarily to the finance markets.  They will not choose 
law that helps others.
2.  Agency and single-mindedness
As Henry Hansmann has emphasized, governance is extraordinarily  expensive.  
One aspect of the governance problem is that we do not have a successful, mutually 
acceptable way of resolving differences.  When there is no consensus and discussion does 
not create one, all the available solutions are problematic.75
We can take a vote, but while majority support offers a basis for making any 
given decision, it does not create legitimacy where there was none before.  No one 
believes that majority vote can make a wrong into a right: American apartheid was not 
more justifiable in those states where whites were a majority than in those where they 
were a minority, nor would Nazi Germany be more attractive if, as Goldhagen claims, 
murderous anti-Semitism was widely popular rather than just the view of a tiny elite gone 
mad.76  Most dramatically in our own history, no side to the slavery struggle considered 
that a majority vote was a proper basis on which to decide the question, unless the forum 
that was to vote was so constituted as to predetermine the result.  
Even where fundamental moral issues are not at stake, on significant issues, the 
losing side is unlikely to give up, and when the same group perceives itself as losing 
consistently, it is likely to reject the entire process.  While language groups and cultures 
have decided to assimilate (collectively or individually) for a variety of reasons, I know 
of no instance in which a minority language or culture has viewed a vote of the larger 
group as a legitimate basis for the end of collective existence.77
Similarly, more individualistic decision making methods–the classic liberal 
device embodied in our First Amendment of collectively deciding only not to decide–will 
fail to convince those who believe that the very issue is whether such individual decision-
74See, OSCAR WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (arguing that lock-in is most important reason for 
governance protection in the corporation).  
75For a fuller discussions of these problems in democratic theory, see, Akhnai, supra n. ; Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty, 
supra n. . 
76DANIEL J. GOLDHAGEN, HITLER'S WILLING EXECUTIONERS: ORDINARY GERMANS AND THE HOLOCAUST (1996).
77For examples of voluntary abandonment of cultural or linguistic identity, consider the history of almost any American 
ethnic group; for rejection of majoritarianism as a basis for determining that identity, consider the history of every 
separationist nationalist movement.  See, generally, WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY 
OF MINORITY RIGHTS (1995) (discussing national rights of ethnic minorities).
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making is acceptable.78  For those who believe that abortion is murder, or that teaching 
evolution or blasphemy are offenses against God and state, or that a republic can not long 
stand if its children are deliberately kept innocent of basic scientific knowledge or its 
adults permitted to accumulate and bequest wealth great enough to buy loyal dependants, 
or that a society should devote a significant part of its collective resources to activities 
that markets cannot provide (whether they be armies or the arts), a decision to exclude the 
matter from the political process is a defeat, pure and simple.  If abortion is an individual 
decision, it is not banned; murder is not something we leave to individual conscience, so 
Roe (or even legal abortion after rape) is a political decision that abortion is not murder.79
If we were to decide that armies (or museums, cathedrals, parks, schools, social security, 
health insurance, Western water systems, ranching rights on public lands, or baseball 
stadiums) should be provided by profit-seeking entrepreneurs or private charity, 
collectively we would have decided that they are not terribly important, at least relative to 
things that markets provide effectively, like corn flakes, cars and commercial television, 
or things we continue not to trust to markets, like highways or the price of oil.
In the firm, capital’s governance issues are resolved by law,  because the law 
creates a uniformity of interest for all investors.  
First, taking investors as investors alone (that is, neglecting their other roles and 
values), our financial markets allow all investors to be treated as if they were identical 
clones.  Even pure investors, of course, have different risk tolerances, different time 
frames and different views on the likelihood of success of particular plans.  But portfolio 
theory has taught us that managers should (and do) manage without regard for their 
investors’ risk or time preferences.  In a functioning public capital market, all investors–
regardless of their personal risk preferences or time frames–should be looking for the 
same thing: the portfolio with the best available risk/reward ratio, discounting future 
rewards to present value but otherwise neglecting timing.  
Moreover, for investors without particular non-public information in reasonably 
competitive financial markets, this generally will be the most widely diversified market 
portfolio (known as “M”, for market).  Those who prefer less risk will hold less of this 
risky portfolio and more of the best available low risk investment, while those who prefer 
more risk will reverse the ratios.  But each will look for the same thing in risky 
investments: the best available risk/reward ratio, neglecting both the absolute amount of 
risk and any diversifiable risk. 
Just as both risk seeking and risk averse investors look for the same behavior in 
corporate managers, similarly investors with long and short term horizons also should 
choose the same equity investments.  It is simply cheaper and more effective to adjust for 
78For further discussion, see, Daniel JH Greenwood, First Amendment Imperialism (a response to Michael Walzer’s Leary 
Lecture), 1999 UTAH L. REV. 659 (1999) <http://www.law.utah.edu/greenwood/html/Leary.htm>.
79For further discussion, see, Daniel JH Greenwood, Beyond Dworkin’s Dominions:  Investments, Memberships, The Tree 
of Life and the Abortion Question, 72 TEXAS L. REV. 559 (1994) 
<http://www.law.utah.edu/greenwood/html/Dworkin.htm>.
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time preferences elsewhere.  This is why our longest term investors–insurance 
companies, pension funds and endowments that are effectively eternal–can also be the 
shortest-term traders.80  The result is that both portfolios and firms (which are themselves 
portfolios for these purposes) should invest as if their investors were risk and time 
indifferent.   While people are never risk or time indifferent, the market allows them to 
invest as if they were. 
 Thus, these differences between investors drop out, allowing managers to treat 
them as if they were all the same and eliminating most governance conflicts that might 
divide pure investors.  Critically, managers need not concern themselves with whether 
their shareholders are widows and orphans, savvy insurance companies, or day traders 
and arbitrageurs: Portfolio theory ensures that the same corporate decisions are 
appropriate for all investors and all these groups will seek the same profit-maximizing 
actions from management.   
Similarly, since portfolio investors treat firms as cash flows with associated risks, 
managers also should act as if investors were utterly uncommitted to any given 
investment, location, or set of human relationships.  The human investors aren’t, of 
course: most obviously, a large percentage of publicly traded stock is held by pension 
funds, the beneficiaries of whom (most of whom are still working) are likely to be 
anything but indifferent between investments in the firm (or location or industry) where 
they work and alternatives.  But most institutional investors (and corporate managers) are 
barred by law from considering these differences between investors, and even when the 
law doesn’t bar such considerations, the dynamics of markets operating on limited 
information will.  Firms, then, will again act as if investors were all the same.
These solutions to the governance problems of capital create a seemingly 
homogeneous capital pool.  Firms, then, can be managed by agents on behalf of capital 
without the agent having to consult the actual investors at all: any competent professional 
can imagine the goals of a rational investor who is assumed to have no interest other than 
profit maximization.  The result, as Hansmann points out, is that it is easier and cheaper 
to manage firms on behalf of capital, since there are no disagreements to worry about.  
But it is also important to emphasize, as Hansmann does not, that  the unity of 
capital is artifactual.  Firms managed on behalf of these fictional shareholders are time 
indifferent, risk indifferent, free of any commitment to particular products, technologies, 
employees or location.  But that can’t be true of the human investors taken individually or 
collectively.  To the extent that the human investors–who are, more or less, the citizenry–
have any commitments, the corporate law system assures that firms will undervalue them.  
We have created a law under which we–even as investors–have no mechanism to say that 
sometimes profit maximization should give way to other values.  
The artificial unity of investors also assures that capital, or fictional shareholders, 
will have a comparative advantage in negotiations with other corporate participants.  
80For a fuller discussion, see Fictional Shareholders, supra n. .
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Employees have no mechanism to disguise their different risk preferences, time 
preferences, location preferences and personal commitments.  While pension funds are 
managed on behalf of an ageless beneficiary, always about to retire but never doing so, 
actual employees must forge difficult to create and maintain coalitions between those 
who are primarily concerned with the short term–resume building youngsters or about to 
cash out veterans–and those who are in it for the long term; between the footloose and the 
rooted; the risk loving (or option holding) and the conservatives (or undiversified); those 
who are committed to a particular job and those who are not.  This fractious coalition will 
have little chance in a negotiation with a single-minded agent for a fictional unified 
capital.  As a result, the very real interest of capital in profit-maximization will be unduly
likely to prevail against any set of competing interests.
Similar results will obtain even in the simplest negotiation of all, the negotiation 
over the spoils of the corporate system.  The corporate law system assures that investors 
are represented by a single agent with a single voice, while employees (at least in the 
absence of a strong industry-wide union, an absence guaranteed by US law) will always 
be divided.  In a perfectly competitive market, this difference might not matter.  But 
employees (at least outside of Silicon Valley during the dot.com boom)81 always face a 
partial monopoly in their employer and high transaction costs in re-entering the job 
market.  The constructed unity of the corporation means that many employees face one 
employer: the employer can generate competition among employees more easily than the 
reverse.  In effect, race to the bottom/top corporate law creates a union–and a closed 
shop–for capital, while leaving the rest of the corporation unorganized.  This, like the 
mobility of capital, should lead to fictional shareholders obtaining a larger share of the 
corporate surplus than they would in a more even handed bargain.  
Law determines the background rules within which shareholders bargain with 
other corporate participants; the race to the bottom/top excludes those other participants 
from the law making process.  The predictable result ought to be higher returns to capital 
and upper management than in the absence of the race.
81In Silicon Valley during the boom, it appears, a largely youthful workforce was strikingly mobile.  Because of a high 
concentration of similar firms in a small geographic area, an extensive professional network that is not firm based, and a 
lack of firm-specific incentives (such as immobile health insurance or pensions), workers could move from firm to firm 
with a minimum of disruption to their personal lives.  In Silicon Valley, job switching didn’t involve pulling the kids out of 
school, making new friends or gaps in health coverage.  This unusual employee mobility should have put employees into a 
better negotiating position relative to capital and assure that mobile employees receive a larger share of the corporate 
surplus than is seen in less mobile industries.  He who can walk, wins. 
In the post-boom era, a tighter job market has enabled many employers–who presumably correctly concluded that mobile 
employees are better able to demand a larger share of the corporate pie–to return to a more standard model.  By refusing to 
hire the formerly footloose (even where this imposes short-term costs on the firm), managers (over the longer term) can 
reduce employee bargaining power.  In the next boom, employees will think twice before using the power that mobility 
seemingly gives them, for fear of entering this blacklist.  For an anecdotal account, see Scott Thurm, System Failure: In 
Silicon Valley, a techie-for-hire struggles to get by, 4/23/02 WALL ST. J. at A1 (describing reluctance of employers to hire 
highly qualified formerly mobile individual).  
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3.  Boundary issues: limited liability, externalities, entity taxation and 
related issues
Corporate law determines the firmness of firms: whether, when trouble happens, 
there will be a there there.  It is fundamental to Delaware law that the corporation, not 
those who profit from it, is liable for the corporation’s debts, meaning that only corporate 
assets are available to unsecured corporate creditors.  (Secured creditors, of course, may 
obtain rights to other assets by agreement, and in public corporations it is not uncommon 
for secured creditors to have claims against various members of a corporate group while 
unsecured creditors are left to slimmer pickings.)  
It is similarly fundamental that the corporation’s directors and shareholders have 
nearly unfettered discretion in determining the scope, financial structure and activities of 
the corporation.82  Thus, the directors  may choose to put new projects inside or outside 
the existing corporation.  They may choose to pursue risky projects or to stultify the firm 
in a stagnant status quo.  For any given set of projects, they may finance them jointly or 
separately; by debt,  new equity issuance, or retained earnings.  They may staff them with 
new or existing employees, located in new or existing locations, using new or existing 
physical capital.  They can combine the corporation with others or divide into pieces.   
Similarly, as a formal legal matter,  the directors have virtually complete control 
over the degree to which the corporation will have assets available for unsecured 
creditors including employees, long term unsecured creditors, pensioners, tort claimants 
or regulators.  By encumbering corporate assets with prior liens, or distributing them to 
shareholders as dividends, the share/manager alliance can shift risk to current or future 
creditors or decide to protect those corporate participants.  
Creditors with bargaining power will protect themselves in a race to the top type 
manner by obtaining security interests in corporate, and if necessary, even extra-
corporate assets.  But the race to the top is of no avail for corporate claimants who do not 
engage in ex ante negotiations and thus cannot force the firm to internalize its future 
defections: for example, tort victims, the environment and governmental regulators.  Less 
obviously, other claimants who may have ex ante negotiations, such as employees or 
pensioners, may not be able to predict defections with sufficient clarity.  Standard 
cognitive bias theory suggests that employees should be likely to underestimate the 
probability of corporate failure and will not adequately charge for it, just as factory 
workers do not adequately charge for predictable accidents.
The race to the bottom/top assures that state corporate law will never protect 
these unsecured “outsiders” no matter how deserving they may be or how efficient 
correcting the pricing mechanism (which under current law undervalues their claims) 
might be.  If corporate managers can find a way to extract extra value from pensioners, 
82Some structural changes may require shareholder consent, but even when share consent is required, as in formal mergers, 
generally there are relatively similar alternatives that do not require share votes.  Creeping acquisitions or decisions 
regarding reinvested earnings can transform a company as radically as a merger without ever entitling the shareholders to a 
vote.  Rarely indeed will other corporate participants have blocking power. 
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corporate law encourages them to do so.  Similarly, the free corporate choice of law 
assures that corporate law will be fundamentally antagonistic to tax collection, accident 
prevention and tort regulation, unionization and employee benefits and so on.  The larger 
the share of the corporate pie these claimants receive, the less there is for the 
managerial/share alliance that chooses corporate law.
Tort law is a particularly egregious example.  State tort law attempts to make 
businesses internalize the cost of the accidents they predictably create, thus ameliorating 
a critical market failure that otherwise threatens to destroy the accuracy of the pricing 
mechanism on which our capitalist system depends.  Corporate law works in precisely the 
opposite direction: it invites businesses, by incorporating and limiting the assets they 
keep available for unsecured creditors, to take risks at the expense of third parties.  
Whether tort law is properly calibrated is–rightly–a highly controversial topic.  
There should be nothing controversial, however, about the democratic implications of our 
current system.  So long as the race to the bottom/top exists, the most important part of 
Texas tort law is that corporate law directs managers to evade tort law as much as 
possible; corporate law gives manager the tools to do by encouraging managers to see 
social responsibility as outside their purview but limiting the assets available for tort 
creditors as a key part of their role; and the content of corporate law is determined by 
those very managers it creates and directs to ignore the social good.  This self-reinforcing 
cycle of substantive law-avoidance, as much as the  Texas legislature, determines the 
degree to which Texas tort law has any bite.  
The same is true of much other law.  Remedies against a corporation are 
meaningful only to the extent that the corporation has a continuing existence: individuals 
to be enjoined and assets to be seized.  The race to the top/bottom assures that corporate 
managers will be relatively unencumbered in planning corporate structures that allow 
them (and shares) to profit during the good times and dump costs on outsiders during the 
bad ones. Long term contractors, including employees who hope to have long term 
employment or pensions, must either irrationally assume that corporations will resist the 
directions corporate law gives them, or recognize that they inhabit a market for lemons 
and plan accordingly–inefficiently settling for second-best solutions.  Good professionals 
will understand their roles to require that they use this freedom in precisely this sleazy 
and anti-growth way.
4.  Who is the firm: portfolio theory and the goals of the public corporation
 When firms are run in the interests of their shareholders as constructed by 
current law, they are not actually run by the human beings who are the ultimate 
beneficiary of our institutional shareholders nor even in their interests.  Rather, they are 
run in the interest of share-value maximization–which may be quite contrary to the 
interests of the real people who own the shares.  Line employees, through their pension 
plans, now own a significant portion of the American publicly traded stock.  But that 
stock is voted, and managers who act in its interest act, without regard for any interests 
those employees have as citizens or even as employees.  Even employees, pensioners and 
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universities, when they own shares,  are imagined to be interested only in share value 
maximization. 
Free corporate choice of law results in managers largely abandoning any attempt 
to run the firm in the interests of anyone other than themselves and these fictional one-
sided shareholders.  Accordingly, it gives the capital market an extraordinary influence 
over our public corporations.
Following the dictates of corporate finance, share prices will rise when firms take 
on extra risk. The market pressures firms to act more like itself:  since diversified 
portfolio shareholders can eliminate all firm specific risk, they do not value stability, 
rootedness, or commitments.  Rather, they value firms that, like portfolio investors, see 
each moment as an opportunity to reevaluate all existing projects.  This tends to be bad 
for the human beings associated with the firm, since human beings, unlike shares, are 
always committed, relatively rooted, and never time indifferent.
Not the shareholders but the market calls the shots–and the market, following the 
dictates of portfolio theory, has a very clear and particular program: Firms should pursue 
the best available investment opportunities, understood as those with the best risk-reward 
ratio, without regard to overall levels of risk, specifics of cash flow, or any other 
commitments.  Like the market itself, firms should be fully mobile and utterly 
uncommitted.
This slightly surprising result follows from the nature of the finance markets as 
currently structured and understood, and stands independent of any political beliefs the 
ultimate human holders of securities may have.  Like so many of the political decisions 
we have tied to corporate law, it is a consequence of portfolio theory and rational 
behavior under the restricted rules of the market, not of conspiracy.  The actual views of 
the actual citizens involved are functionally irrelevant.  Union-owned pension plans will 
not act any differently in any significant way (for present purposes) than the most class 
conscious member of the capitalist bourgeoisie.  
The key to the portfolio theory dominated market agenda is this:  Diversified 
portfolio investors can eliminate virtually all firm-specific risk themselves.  They view 
firms as largely interchangeable–each one is a predicted cash flow with a degree of 
probability, and little else.  Portfolio theory teaches that the cash flow and risk 
characteristics of a portfolio are largely independent of the cash flow and risk 
characteristics of the individual components of the portfolio: thus, in the most famous 
example, an extremely cautious investor can do better (achieve a higher expected return 
at any given risk level) by purchasing risky assets than by buying (only) safe ones.  
Indeed, in the pure theory, given equal information all investors, regardless of risk 
preference, should buy the same portfolio–a market index of the risky assets and some 
quantity of T-bills.  The only difference between risk loving and risk averse investors 
would be in the quantity of T-bills they hold: risk averse investors do not hold lower risk 
stocks than risk loving investors.
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Another way to look at the same portfolio theory point is that risk averse  
portfolio investors will find that they can eliminate firm-specific risk from their portfolios 
and achieve their preferred level of overall risk almost without cost (by diversification 
and holding more or less T-bills).  Firms, in contrast, can reduce such risk only 
imperfectly and usually at great cost--most obviously, diversification at the firm level is 
the same thing as giving up the benefits of specialization.   Even risk-averse shareholders, 
in their investor role, thus, should oppose measures to reduce diversifiable risk at the firm 
level; they can eliminate it more cheaply “at home” by holding a diversified portfolio of 
undiversified firms.
In contrast, investors seeking risk in some part of their investment portfolio will 
not necessarily be indifferent to risk at the firm level.  They may prefer more risk than 
they can create outside of the firm.  Once a portfolio reaches zero T-bills, portfolio theory 
counsels that the best way to increase risk further is to borrow money, which may not be 
possible, or not possible at a rate as low as the firm could achieve.  Accordingly, while 
risk-averse portfolio investors are indifferent as to diversifiable firm-level risk, seeking 
only the most favorable risk/reward ratio, risk loving portfolio investors may prefer 
significantly worse risk/reward ratios at the firm level in order to achieve high overall 
levels of risk.  Shareholders as a group, as a result, will not be risk neutral, but rather risk 
seeking, even at some cost.
Similarly, portfolio theory teaches that given similar expectations about business 
prospects, individual investors should all hold the same stock portfolio regardless of their 
time preferences. Those who need current income and those who do not will choose the 
same stock, based solely on its risk/return ratio and not on its dividend policy or the 
timing of the firms cash flows.  Indeed, Wall Street can be thought of as specializing in 
adjusting firm cash flows to fit the needs of each individual investor, outside of the firm.
Similarly again, the central lesson of portfolio theory is that investors should not 
be unduly concerned with the particulars of any given company’s investments: indeed, 
the counsel to diversify is precisely the opposite.  Rather than being deeply committed to 
a particular business, product, place, set of people or relationships, portfolio investors 
diversify to eliminate the effects of those details on their investment returns.  
The net result is that portfolio investors act (in their investing) as if they were 
risk indifferent, time indifferent, place indifferent and free of all commitment to any 
particularity.  This is the source of the well-known paradox that mutual funds and 
pension funds, which are immortal permanent investors–with the longest possible time-
frame of investors in a human community–are notoriously our shortest term traders (with 
the possible exception of  the unlamented Internet day traders).  All firms, even or 
especially for the long term investor, appear as nothing more than a predicted cash flow 
at a predicted risk.  If a better predicted risk/return package is available elsewhere, the 
investor simply switches.
A shareholder-run firm, then, is likely to be a highly risky firm.  Moreover, like 
an aging roue, it is likely to have a serious commitment problem: financial markets do not 
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marry investments.  Employees, in contrast, are likely to prefer less firm-specific risk, if 
only because they are less able to diversify to avoid it and because steady firm growth 
usually provides maximum job security and the least disruptive path to career 
advancement, let alone life outside the firm.  Similarly, other long-term creditors (formal 
ones such as bond holders or pensioners, and informal ones such as non-commodity 
suppliers or neighbors) are likely to benefit from steady growth patterns, which in effect 
increase the security of their loan (or similar claim) without lowering the compensation 
they receive.83
Furthermore, the finance market being without any long term commitments to 
businesses, localities, relationships, products or people, shareholder controlled firms are 
likely to be remade in the market’s image.  While employee controlled firms (or even 
ones with powerful unions) are notoriously committed to job stability and to the current 
employee body, share controlled firms are far more likely to shed and regain employees, 
products and businesses in the manner of a dieting baby boomer.  As different business 
opportunities appear, each can be judged by the risk adjusted present value of the 
expected returns; professionals acting on behalf of shares are less likely to be moved by 
intangible factors such as morale, firm-specific investments by employees, long standing 
relationships with particular places, people or products, patriotism or even a quality 
product.  While such traditions or stability may have value to the people involved, the 
value is unlikely to be reflected in the risk/return calculations of portfolio managers. 
B. Conclusion: excess mobility
This brief tour through portfolio theory suggests the principal effects of 
legislation by market: 
1.  The stock market has an agenda of its own, one that emphasizes its own 
characteristics of time-indifference, space-indifference, mobility, and lack of 
commitment.  The stock market seeks to increase the mobility of capital, across borders 
and businesses alike, to enable it to pursue the highest possible returns.  But people are 
never so mobile, and high returns to capital, important as they are, are never our only 
political agenda.  People are not time indifferent or place indifferent: while for a 
shareholder, profit here and now is always fungible with profit somewhere else and 
sometime later (properly adjusted for the costs of repatriation and the time value of 
money), for people a job here and now is never the same as one somewhere else or some 
other time.  Capital can shift instantly from Flint to the Philippines and then on to Fresno, 
or from steel to software; people can’t.  
2.  When we turn over lawmaking to the market, we lose the ability to trade 
off market values against non-market values.  Corporations, run on behalf of their 
shareholders, will never choose law that sacrifices shareholder value for human values, 
even if the shareholders might.  Shareholders, after all, are us, and we have many 
83To the extent that bondholders are the same diversified portfolio investors as the shareholders, this effect is lessened: part 
of the benefits the investor wins as a bondholder will be lost as a shareholder.  
© Daniel J.H. Greenwood
Preliminary Draft - Not For Publication 3/05
54
commitments that conflict, at least some of the time, with the needs of the capital market.  
But those commitments will not be reflected in the process we have created. 
3.  In the competition for state law, corporations will choose the law that best 
suits the needs of the capital market.  They will seek maximum flexibility and 
minimum commitment.  They will, for example, oppose any efforts to introduce into 
corporate law notions of continuing obligations to corporate employees, firm products, 
firm suppliers or customers, or the localities (or even countries) in which the firm 
operates.  Such rules (which are not uncommon in other advanced democracies that do 
not have our market driven system of creating corporate law) tend to reduce the share of 
corporate product that goes to shares, and will be rejected by firms seeking to maximize 
share return.  
There is one significant exception to this rule.  When share interests conflict with 
those of upper management, firms may choose law that limits share rights.  This is, of 
course, the race to the bottom thesis; I mean not to rehash it here or even to take sides but 
only to point out that the race to the top thesis relies on an assumption that equity markets 
can force managers to internalize the costs of such actions, and that assumption may not 
always be correct.  
Nor is it generally the case that managers and shares are in conflict primarily 
with each other.  The current state of hostile takeover law is a good example: the 
combination of the poison pill and the “stakeholder” constituency statutes have 
essentially eliminated  the hostile takeover.  But while at first glance this might appear to 
be a pure vindication of the race to the bottom thesis, the reality is more complex.  In 
fact, the new law has fortified the current alliance of fictional shareholders and top 
managers against the rest of the corporate participants and furthered, rather than limited, 
the mobility of capital.  Managers no longer oppose the radical restructurings that 
originally motivated the hostile takeover movement.  Instead, they give finance markets 
more or less what they want and take 10% as a commission.  
Market driven law, in short, will be law in the interests and the image of the 
capital market–a law of maximum flexibility and minimum tradition, maximum mobility 
and minimum stability, maximum return to capital and top management and a minimum 
return to labor.  Most importantly, it is simply incapable of sustaining any debate on 
when, if ever, markets should be restrained.  Market mobility conflicts with our needs as 
citizens for a certain level of stability in which to raise our families, produce our culture 
and live our lives.  Excess mobility of capital may, as George Soros has claimed, threaten 
the capital market itself.84  But that issue cannot be a factor in the creation of our 
corporate law so long as it is dominated by the Internal Affairs Doctrine, free corporate 
choice of law and the competition between the states. 
We Americans are mostly descended from those who fled the stagnation of 
stability in small towns here and abroad.  We are unlikely to rush to restrain the markets’ 
84GEORGE SOROS, ON GLOBALIZATION (2002)
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mobility in a major way.  But the voluntary law of corporations removes the issue from 
democratic debate altogether. 
IV.  Conclusion: Who Is A Means And Who An 
End?
The most important differences between a democracy and the other forms of 
government are two.  First, democracies take their citizens to be the ends of the law: the 
good of the citizen is the good of the state.  In a democracy, the citizens are never only 
tools to some goal greater than themselves, means simply to be exploited, or strangers to 
be treated entirely at arms length. 
 Second, democracies allow the citizens to debate and decide their own good; it is 
not imposed on them by government or some supra-governmental movement.  
Democracies do not have established churches, in the broadest sense.85
Corporate law is central to a democracy because it determines, for the 
corporation, who is a citizen and who is a foreigner.  
“Foreigners” are outsiders, external to the firm, to be dealt with at arms length. 
The morality of the marketplace bars the firm from lying to them or stealing from them, 
but certainly doesn’t require empathy with them.  If we can get more work out of an 
outsider for less money, if the outsider doesn’t quite understand the full implications of 
the deal, if a legal loophole allows us to exploit the outsider in some fashion, corporate 
managers are entitled to do so.  Indeed, the profit maximization norm states that they are 
required to do so.  A manager would be in breach of duty if she intentionally offered to 
pay employees more than is necessary to maximize their productivity, or to lower prices 
below the profit maximization point, or to pay taxes that are not legally mandatory, or to 
voluntarily assume a significant social burden without any public relations value.  When 
a manager decides to end legal (and profitable) discrimination, or to give charity, or to 
change production methods so as to reduce pollution well below legal requirements, or to 
increase employee safety beyond profit maximizing levels, his decision is automatically 
suspect.  To be sure, the business judgment rule, the possibility that apparently expensive 
ways of doing business may turn out to be profit maximizing, and the difficulties of 
proving motive offer a great deal of protection for socially minded managers, especially 
if they are not entirely faithful to their role obligations or if creative brilliance or 
cognitive dissonance enables them to see a potential for profit in self-less activity.  
Highly paid workers are less likely to quit and more likely to work hard; charity and 
environmental protection may have public relations value that translates into dollars and 
cents; low prices may bring higher and more profitable market share.  But, the principled 
issue remains: managers have no right to use corporate funds for non-corporate benefits.  
It is all very well to give charity, but it is not all very well to give charity with someone 
85I’ve addressed these ideas at greater length in earlier work.  See, Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty, supra n. ; First 
Amendment Imperialism, supra n. ; Akhnai, supra n. .
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else’s money.  Giving outsiders corporate funds is charity, and for this purpose every 
corporate participant other than the shares is an outsider.    
In short, when a corporation works for outsiders, it is doing something 
presumptively wrong under current norms and law.  We expect an explanation along the 
lines of instrumental profit maximization.  And we get them.  It may look like we are 
giving corporate money to the CEO, say directors, but that is just an illusion: really, we 
are buying greater motivation from him.  And so on down the line.  Apparent charity, 
gifts and social responsibility are mere illusions: in reality, corporate managers are forced 
to claim, these apparent acts of good will are selfish–just brutal manipulations designed 
to enrich the corporation.
In contrast, when a corporation treats outsiders as mere tools to its ends, no 
explanation is needed.  A corporation has done nothing that needs justification when it 
pays its employees the legal minimum wage and not a penny more; employs hordes of 
lawyers to find the minimum taxes it can legally pay; lobbies to modify environmental 
regulation to allow it to poor more junk into the air; or charges the highest price the 
market will bear.  So long as the corporation remains within the law, the managers are 
entitled–indeed expected–to act as if the rest of society were of no interest to them.  A 
corporation treats outsiders as a democracy treats foreigners: with respect, one hopes, but 
without solidarity. 
Under current law, shareholders are different.  A corporation that gives its 
shareholders more than the market demands is praiseworthy, with no overtones of breach 
of duty.  Unlike high wages, low prices or charity, high dividends are not a suspicious act 
that needs to be defended in terms of the long run interests of the firm.  Sometimes firms 
do offer instrumental explanations of high dividend policies: corporations have been 
heard to say that a high and steadily increasing dividend makes the financial markets 
more likely to support the firm, just as a high and steadily increasing wage makes 
employees more loyal.  But corporate law does not require or encourage such excuses.  
No derivative action lies to test whether this explanation is a mere excuse for a give-away 
of corporate assets, because in the law’s view, giving money to shareholders is not a 
give-away at all86.  Giving corporate assets to shareholders is not even potentially waste 
or breach of duty.  
The difference is simple: shareholders are “citizens,” not “foreigners.”  Just as a 
democracy is supposed to work for its citizens, just as benefitting the partners is the same 
as benefitting a partnership, so too in the ordinary course our corporate law views 
benefitting the shareholders as the same thing as benefitting the corporation.  A benefit to 
citizens is not a cost but rather a profit: it is a benefit to the institution.  The difference 
between corporate citizens and corporate foreigners, then, is that benefits to the former 
are viewed as benefits to the corporation while benefits to the latter are costs to it.
86Except at or near bankruptcy, at which time some courts see a fiduciary duty to protect corporate creditors. 
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As a rule, modern corporate accounting and modern Delaware-model corporate 
law  view shareholders as “citizens” and all other corporate participants as “costs”.  
Payments to all corporate factors of production reduce profits, with the sole exception of 
those made to shares, which are thought of as made out of profits (defined as whatever is 
left after the other payments are made).  There is nothing inevitable about this division, 
deeply ingrained as it is in our legal culture.  Non-profit corporations (especially non-
membership firms) have a radically different sense of who their “citizens” are; so do 
partnerships (which include some employees as “citizens”), cooperatives and other 
established business forms.  Corporate constituency acts in most states recognize the 
possibility (even if they do not create the actuality) of a broader view of the corporate 
citizenry.  At the edge of insolvency, we admit creditors into the “citizen” group.  Some 
of our most successful institutions have multiple and conflicting “citizen” conceptions: 
Harvard University’s Corporation appears to view its faculty, students, urban neighbors, 
educational and research missions, buildings and investments as both “citizens” and costs 
at different times and in different circumstances.
Corporate law decides who is a citizen and who is a cost.  If corporate law made 
the environment an object of the fiduciary duty of corporations, profit-maximizing 
corporate managers would lobby for stronger–not weaker–environmental regulation.  
Only if they were freed to spend more money on reducing pollution, for example by 
penalizing free-loading competitors, would they be able to fulfill their mission. When 
environmental expenditures (like dividends) count as profit, responsible managerial 
maximizers will maximize it.  If corporate law made employees citizens, managers might 
fight to pay shareholders the minimum they could get away, with Wall Street busting 
replacing union busting as a major and lucrative consulting specialty.  The creative 
energies that now go into finding new ways to defect on bond contracts (so as to allow 
shifting corporate assets to shares) might instead be directed to finding ways to fool the 
equity markets (so as to allow shifting corporate assets to pay increases).    
In a perfectly efficient and perfectly competitive friction-free market none of this 
would matter.  All factors of production–shares no more or less than others–would be 
paid no more or less than their own cost of production.  In the real world, friction usually 
is determinative.  Managers directed to work for fictional shareholders will seek to evade 
laws that direct them to treat any other value or person as important.  Managers given a 
different task would often act differently.  
Corporate law, then, is anything but empty.  It matters enormously.  Our decision 
to leave corporate law to the corporations is a decision to create self-guided autonomous 
power centers under the control of no one.  A market for law responsive to a financial 
market structured by law that it itself structures, with little input from citizens except 
within very narrow role constraints: this is the system we have created.  It is one that is 
unlikely to reflect most human values except by accident. 
**end**
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